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QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES?1  
LIMITS ON WIDESPREAD 
SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE 
GATHERING BY LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AFTER 9/11 
In the decade since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, local law 
enforcement has become the front line in the nation’s counterterrorism 
strategy.  This involvement has not come without controversy.  As part of 
these counterterrorism efforts, police departments have begun to establish 
widespread surveillance and intelligence-gathering networks to monitor 
Muslim and other ethnic neighborhoods in the hopes of stopping the next 
terrorist attack at its source.  Such surveillance does not necessarily run 
afoul of the Constitution, and both our political environment—in which 
voters demand that the government stop terrorism at all costs—as well as 
unprecedented levels of federal funding to fight terrorism have made these 
surveillance programs an attractive option for local law enforcement.  But 
the same programs risk compromising citizens’ civil liberties and 
damaging police relationships with ethnic communities.  This Comment 
analyzes whether and how a balance might be struck between national 
security and individual civil liberties interests, and offers a model 
statutory solution drawn from police surveillance in a non-terrorism-
related context as one possible way forward. 
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1. Literally translated from the Latin, “Who will guard the guards themselves?,” see 
GABRIEL G. ADELEYE & KOFI ACQUAH-DADZIE, WORLD DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN 
EXPRESSIONS: A RESOURCE FOR READERS AND WRITERS 332 (Thomas J. Sienkewicz & 
James T. McDonough eds., 1999), though the phrase is sometimes translated more 
figuratively as “Who watches the watchmen?”  One of the most famous epigrams, it appears 
in Juvenal’s Satire VI.   JUVENAL: THE SATIRES 200 (John Ferguson ed., 1979).  Juvenal was 
a Roman satirist of the first and second centuries; although little is known about his life, 
including the dates of his birth, death, and authorship of the satires, most estimates place the 
satires between 110 and 120 A.D.  CHRISTOPHER KELK, THE SATIRES OF JUVENAL: A 
VERSE TRANSLATION ix (2010). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Late in his majority opinion in the 1983 Supreme Court case of 
United States v. Knotts, in which police placed a criminal suspect under 
continuous surveillance2 to discover the location of his secret lair, then-
Associate Justice William Rehnquist addressed the defendant’s 
argument that allowing police to conduct such surveillance without a 
warrant was a slippery slope that would ultimately lead to “twenty-four 
hour surveillance of any citizen of this country . . . without judicial 
knowledge or supervision.”3  As members of the Court are wont to do 
when dealing with hypothetical fact patterns, Justice Rehnquist punted, 
writing that “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as 
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough 
then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be 
applicable.”4  In hindsight, Justice Rehnquist’s response can hardly be 
called regrettable; at the time, long-term surveillance was typically 
subject to multiple levels of review and only implemented if the benefits 
outweighed the costs.5  And so it was that the Court upheld the use of 
the tracking device, Knotts lost his appeal, and Justice Rehnquist’s 
promise was consigned to the dusty pages of volume 460 of the United 
States Reports. 
Perhaps, that is, until now.  At the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, a series of unexpected events has made systematic, widespread, 
twenty-four-hour surveillance of not just individuals but entire 
neighborhoods and cities a reality.6  This series of events began with the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which prompted a seismic shift 
 
2. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276-80 (1983).  Knotts, which involved the use 
of a primitive GPS tracking device, is discussed in more detail infra in Part III.C.1; see also 
infra note 145 (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in another case involving GPS 
tracking devices, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), and its potential impact on 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).  But note that the defendant’s argument—and the scope 
of this Comment—both focus on broader surveillance practices, of which GPS tracking 
devices are only a subset. 
3. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 9, Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (no. 
81-1802)). 
4. Id. 
5. For example, in the 1980s, the FBI’s Undercover Operations Review Committee 
reviewed undercover operations and classified them as either Group I or Group II 
investigations; those classified as Group I—because they were expected to cost more than 
$20,000, last longer than six months, or involve “sensitive circumstances”—were subject to 
multiple layers of approval and a multi-factor cost–benefit analysis.  GARY T. MARX, 
UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 183 (1988). 
6. See infra Part II.B for some of the most high-profile examples from recent years. 
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in our nation’s security priorities that has penetrated to the lowest levels 
of local government.  As part of this shift, the federal government has 
poured unprecedented levels of funding into local police departments, 
removing many of the economic barriers to extended, widespread police 
surveillance and intelligence gathering that previously existed.7  As a 
result, police surveillance is now testing the boundaries of constitutional 
jurisprudence in ways that—as Justice Rehnquist may have assumed in 
1983—would never have seemed likely, or even possible. 
This Comment undertakes the analysis that might occur if, thirty 
years later, we were to field Justice Rehnquist’s punt in Knotts and 
assess whether constitutional principles may be applicable to such 
surveillance—and if not, what the next-best solution for protecting 
individuals’ civil liberties might be.  It begins in Part II with an overview 
of the events during the last decade that have led us to this point, 
describing the shift in national priorities that followed September 11, 
2001, and detailing two of the more infamous cases of widespread police 
surveillance and intelligence gathering that have surfaced in recent 
years.8  Part III assesses whether constitutional principles are applicable 
to this new surveillance, namely, the Fourth Amendment’s protections 
of individuals’ privacy through its prohibition on unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  In an effort to illuminate the present state of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, Part III also dives into the Amendment’s 
historical roots and discusses three key exceptions to its general rule.  
Finding the Fourth Amendment’s protections inadequate, Part IV 
discusses the next-best alternative, statutory protections, and the 
competing interests—national security and individuals’ privacy—that 
must be taken into account when drafting potential legislation.  Finally, 
Part V returns to the present, drawing upon a recent instance of police 
surveillance and intelligence gathering conducted on anti-death penalty 
activists in Maryland to develop a model statutory solution that strikes a 
balance between protecting citizens’ civil liberties and affording police 
the latitude to conduct investigation when the need arises.  Part V goes 
 
7. See infra Part II.A. 
8. Because this Comment is primarily concerned with widespread police surveillance 
and intelligence gathering conducted by local law enforcement agencies, it does not discuss 
past federal programs such as the U.S. Defense Department’s Counterintelligence Field 
Activity database or the TALON reporting mechanism.  For a discussion of these topics, see 
Lisa Myers et al., Is the Pentagon Spying on Americans?, NBCNEWS.COM (Dec. 14, 2005, 6:18
 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10454316/ns/nbcnightlynews-nbc_news_investigates/t/pe
ntagon-spying-americans/. 
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on to analyze how such a model statute might have helped to mitigate 
some of the police conduct detailed in Part II.  Part VI concludes. 
II. COUNTERTERRORISM AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
In the decade following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in 
New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, the United States 
understandably redirected a significant portion of its national resources 
toward counterterrorism and homeland security.9  But while a shift in 
national priorities was inevitable—given that homeland security has a 
primarily national scope—an equivalent shift in state and local law 
enforcement priorities may not have been as predictable.  As this Part 
will show, however, that shift has occurred.  Local law enforcement 
agencies are now widely involved in counterterrorism activities in a 
variety of capacities, including (and in some cases, especially) 
surveillance and intelligence gathering.  With this increased 
involvement, however, has come an unfortunate side effect: 
counterterrorism surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations 
implemented by local law enforcement agencies have brushed against 
constitutional protections of individuals’ privacy and civil liberties.  This 
Part will first provide a summary of the changes that have occurred with 
respect to local law enforcement and counterterrorism priorities over 
the last decade, and then review some of the more recent examples of 
police activity that have aroused concerns over civil liberties. 
A. The Transformation of Local Law Enforcement Following 
September 11, 2001 
As some have noted, “the most striking feature” of law enforcement 
in the United States is its decentralization.10  There are about 600,000 to 
 
9. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on Nov. 25, 2002, by 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).  The Act brought twenty-two different federal agencies 
under DHS’s authority.  Donald F. Kettl, Overview, in THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME LAND 
SECURITY’S FIRST YEAR: A REPORT CARD 1, 1 (Donald F. Kettl ed., 2004).  In the year 
following the creation of DHS, the number of federal government employees focused on 
homeland security doubled; today, DHS has 183,000 employees, making it the third-largest 
Cabinet-level department, after the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans 
Affairs.  U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Executive Branch Civilian Employment Since 1940, FED.
EMP. STAT. (Sept. 30), http://www.opm.gov/feddata/HistoricalTables/ExecutiveBranchSince1
940.asp. 
10. David Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 
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700,000 local police officers in the United States,11 spread out among 
somewhere from 13,000 to 19,000 local law enforcement agencies across 
the country.12  Despite the fact that local law enforcement accounts for 
the majority of crime fighting in the United States,13 its experience with 
counterterrorism and national security prior to September 11, 2001, was 
minimal. 
Instead, over the years, local law enforcement has been drawn into 
the national security arena only occasionally—for example, after World 
War I,14 both before and after World War II,15 and again during the 
1980s16 and early 1990s17—and never for any consistent purpose.  The 
result was that, by the mid-1990s, many states had enacted statutes 
criminalizing terrorist activities,18 yet less than half of all local law 
enforcement agencies had developed contingency plans for terrorist 
 
635 (2005). 
11. See id. (estimating more than 600,000 local law enforcement officers in the United 
States); David E. Kaplan, Spies Among Us, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 8, 2006, at 40, 43 
(estimating over 700,000 officers). 
12. See Thacher, supra note 10, at 635 (counting nearly 13,000 local law enforcement 
agencies in the United States); Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American 
Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 
377, 380 (2009) (finding sources that cite up to 19,000 agencies).   
13. Waxman, supra note 12, at 380. 
14. In 1919 and 1920, local police assisted the Bureau of Investigation (the predecessor 
to the modern-day Federal Bureau of Investigation, or FBI) in the Palmer Raids, a series of 
mass arrests of suspected left-wing radicals.  Id. at 379. 
15. In 1939, with World War II looming, President Franklin Roosevelt urged “all police 
officers, sheriffs, and all other law enforcement officers in the United States” to turn over any 
evidence regarding acts of “espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities and 
violations of the neutrality law” to the FBI.  Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown 
(Counter) Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1715 (2010) (quoting 1 NAT’L 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CTR., A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE READER: AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR II 177 (Frank J. Rafalko ed., 2004)).  In the 1950s and 1960s, 
the FBI enlisted local law enforcement in its Counter-Intelligence Program, which was 
designed to gather information about “allegedly subversive political groups.”  Waxman, supra 
note 12, at 379. 
16. In 1980, the FBI’s New York City field office established the first Joint Terrorism 
Task Force in response to a series of domestic terrorism incidents.  NAT’L COMM’N ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 81 
(2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
17. The FBI’s New York City Joint Terrorism Task Force allowed local law enforcement 
in New York City, as well as other federal agencies, to share information with the FBI and to 
become involved in the FBI’s investigations—both throughout the 1980s and again after the 
first World Trade Center bombing in 1993.  Id. 
18. Waxman, supra note 12, at 381. 
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attacks,19 and only about 60% of cities had been in contact with the 
federal government regarding terrorism-related issues.20  Simply put, 
prior to September 11, 2001, “with the exception of one portion of the 
FBI, very little of the sprawling U.S. law enforcement community was 
engaged in countering terrorism.”21 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this began to 
change.  On November 13, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft 
ordered all United States Attorneys to work with local law enforcement 
on counterterrorism measures.22  In 2006, President George W. Bush 
reiterated the importance of local law enforcement to national security.23  
Across the political spectrum, there was no shortage of agreement in 
Washington that local law enforcement represented the country’s “front 
line of defense against terrorism”24 because, as one report put it, “[a]ll 
terrorism is local.”25 
For its part, Congress provided the financial backing to bring local 
law enforcement into the war on terror.  The Homeland Security Act of 
2002,26 which established the Department of Homeland Security, also 
established an Office for State and Local Government Coordination;27 




21. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 82. 
22. Ashcroft issued a memorandum to all United States Attorneys in which he wrote 
that successfully countering the emerging threat of terrorism meant “law enforcement 
officials at all levels of government—federal, state, and local—must work together, sharing 
information and resources needed to both arrest and prosecute the individuals responsible 
and to detect and destroy terrorist cells before they can strike again.”  Memorandum from 
John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys (Nov. 13, 
2001), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=452215.  Ashcroft’s directive gave the 
nation’s ninety-three United States Attorney offices less than three weeks to establish a 
protocol for terrorism-related information sharing with state and local law enforcement 
officials, and required that the protocol provide for the possibility of communication “24 
hours a day, 7 days a week.”  Id. 
23. See President George W. Bush, The White House, Address to the Nation 
on Immigration Reform (May 15, 2006) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060515-8.html). 
24. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 42. 
25. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, FROM HOMETOWN SECURITY TO HOMELAND 
SECURITY: IACP’S PRINCIPLES FOR A LOCALLY DESIGNED AND NATIONALLY 
COORDINATED HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY 3 (2005). 
26. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.). 
27. 6 U.S.C. § 361(a) (2006). 
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advocate for, the resources needed by State and local government to 
implement the national strategy for combating terrorism.”28  Since the 
Act’s passage, the Department of Homeland Security has allocated 
more than $35 billion in federal funding to state and local governments 
to “strengthen[] [the] nation’s ability to prevent, protect, respond to, 
recover from, and mitigate terrorist attacks, major disasters and other 
emergencies.”29  The largest two components of annual appropriation—
together representing more than half of the entire block of annual 
funding—are the State Homeland Security Program and the Urban 
Areas Security Initiative, both of which are primarily aimed at funding 
local law enforcement agencies. 30 
Furthermore, since the passage of the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,31 states must 
ensure that at least 25% of funding received through either the State 
Homeland Security Program or the Urban Areas Security Initiative is 
used for “law enforcement terrorism prevention activities.”32 
State and local law enforcement agencies have readily taken 
advantage of this funding, directing federal counterterrorism dollars into 
at least four different categories of terrorism-related activities at the 
local level, many of which would have been unheard-of—or at least 
 
28. Id. § 361(b)(2). 
29. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces More Than $2.1 
Billion in Preparedness Grants (Aug. 23, 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/08/
23/dhs-announces-more-21-billion-preparedness-grants (describing the allocation of 
“approximately $35 billion” in grants for the period 2002–2011); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., DHS Announces More Than $1.3 Billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 
Preparedness Grant Awards (June 29, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/29/
dhs-announces-more-13-billion-fiscal-year-fy-2012-preparedness-grant-awards [hereinafter 
FY 2012 DHS Grants]. 
30. For example, in the fiscal year 2012 appropriation (announced in June 2012) State 
Homeland Security Program (SHSP) grants totaled $294 million and Urban Areas Security 
Imitative (UASI) grants totaled $490 million.  FY 2012 DHS Grants, supra note 29.  Put 
together, this equals $784 million, or 60%, of the $1.3 billion in total preparedness grants 
issued by DHS that year.  See id.  The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) funding 
“supports the implementation of state Homeland Security Strategies.”  FY 2012 Homeland 
Security Grant Program, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (last updated July 12, 2012, 2:27 
PM), http://www.fema.gov/fy-2012-homeland-security-grant-program.  The Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) provides funding to “address the unique . . . needs of high-threat, 
high-density urban areas, and assists them in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to 
prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.”  Id.   
31. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (codified in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.). 
32. 6 U.S.C. § 607(a)(1). 
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impractical—in a pre-September 11 world.33  First, many local law 
enforcement agencies reassigned personnel to newly created or 
expanded counterterrorism departments.34  Second, law enforcement 
began upgrading its technology and weaponry; recent counterterrorism 
acquisitions by local police include surveillance cameras,35 SUVs that 
can detect nuclear radiation,36 military-grade assault rifles,37 and even an 
unmanned aerial vehicle.38  Third, local law enforcement agencies have 
 
33. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text (noting that the Homeland Security 
Act, which provided state and local law enforcement agencies with a substantial amount of 
federal funding, was passed in 2002, post-9/11). 
34. See, e.g., Chuck Bennett, Shepherding Safe Subways, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 
28, 2006, at A6 (describing how the New York Police Department has deployed canine units 
“devoted exclusively to the subway,” the first such units since the 1980s, whose “overall 
mission is counterterrorism and to fight crime”); Chicago Tribune, Police Expanding Role in 
Fighting Terror, REDEYE, Nov. 12, 2010, at 8 (reporting that the Chicago Police Department 
had widened its mission to include counterterrorism, hired a longtime FBI agent to create a 
counterterrorism and intelligence division within the department, and permanently assigned 
an officer to Washington, D.C., to liaise with federal agencies on counterterrorism); Jennifer 
Maloney, Newest Dogged Pursuit, NEWSDAY (New York), June 14, 2007, at A22 (reporting 
on the New York State Metropolitan Transit Authority’s deployment of canine teams as part 
of counterterrorism efforts on the Long Island Rail Road, the nation’s busiest commuter rail 
system); Terrorism Preparedness Statement, U. ARK. UNIV. POLICE, http://uapd.uark.edu/99.
php (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (describing terrorism preparations made by university police 
at the University of Arkansas, including the assignment of a full-time officer to the regional 
Joint Terrorism Task Force). 
35. E.g., Bradley Olson & Zain Shauk, Smile, If You’re Downtown, HOUS. CHRON., 
Nov. 25, 2010, at A1 (describing a network of 250 to 300 surveillance cameras in downtown 
Houston); Vic Ryckaert, Cameras Help Fight Crime, Police Say, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 
31, 2007, at B1 (reporting on a 67-camera surveillance network in Indianapolis, as well as 
similar networks in Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles, and Chicago). 
36. The New Jersey State Police, the New York Police Department, and the United 
States Secret Service each own SUVs, known as RadTrucks, that are outfitted with $200,000 
worth of radiation detection equipment and used to patrol public highways for potential 
terrorist nuclear threats.  See Sam Wood, New SUVs Are Like Police Radar for Terrorism, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 9, 2007, at B10. 
37. In Massachusetts, more than eighty cities and towns across the state have given their 
police officers access to military-grade assault rifles and other weaponry “in response to the 
fear of terrorist attacks.”  Donovan Slack, Police Add Assault Rifles Across the State, BOS. 
GLOBE, June 3, 2009, at A1.  Notably, in Boston, the largest city in Massachusetts, Mayor 
Thomas Menino refused to issue any of the city’s 200 assault rifles to neighborhood patrol 
officers after community leaders described the use of assault weapons as the “‘militarization’ 
of local police.”  Id. at A12. 
38. In 2011, the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, whose jurisdiction is north of 
Houston in Texas, used federal homeland security grant money to purchase an unmanned 
aerial vehicle for surveillance purposes.  Robert Stanton, Drones Prompt Privacy Fears, 
HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 1, 2011, at B2; Stephen Dean, New Police Drone Near Houston Could 
Carry Weapons, CLICK2HOUSTON.COM, Nov. 10, 2011, http://www.click2houston.com/news/2
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spent considerable time training officers how to respond to terrorist 
threats through classroom instruction, exercises, and, in some cases, 
public drills.39  Finally—now more involved, better funded, better 
trained, and better equipped with the latest technology and weaponry 
than at any point during the last ten years40—local law enforcement 
agencies have sprung into action, providing heightened security41 and 
heightened responses to potential terrorist threats.42  Many of these 
 
9619788/detail.html. 
39. See, e.g., Christine Byers, Training Ground: Terrorist Attacks Lead to New Training 
for St. Louis County Police, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 28, 2011, at B1 (reporting on 
St. Louis County, Missouri, which in 2011 became the first county in the nation to require 
officers department-wide to undergo counterterrorism training); Tom Feeney, Police Practice 
Derailing Terror Threats, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 9, 2006, at 15 (describing a 
150-officer rapid-response force designed to be activated in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, 
which was paid for with funding received from the Department of Homeland Security 
through the Urban Areas Security Initiative); Ann Scott Tyson, Metro Stages a Display of Its 
Force, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2010, at B2 (describing a mock “anti-terrorism sweep” conducted 
by Washington’s Metro Transit Police during a weekday morning rush hour at the city’s 
Union Station, which involved fifty officers armed with M-4 assault rifles and bomb-sniffing 
dogs). 
40. See supra notes 33–39. 
41. Police have become especially sensitive to individuals who act suspiciously near 
traditionally high-profile terrorist targets such as stadiums and airports.  See, e.g., Del 
Quentin Wilber, Police on the Lookout for Terrorists With Missiles Near Airports, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 9, 2006, at A3 (describing how Washington, D.C. area police forces patrol near 
airports to scout for terrorists with shoulder-fired rockets who may be looking to shoot down 
aircrafts during takeoffs and landings).  Indeed, police have become so sensitive that such 
heightened responses are typical even when there is no evidence to connect the suspects to 
known terrorist groups, or even when the site in question is not directly targeted.  See Charlie 
Cain & Francis X. Donnelly, Michigan Quickly Enacts Emergency Plans, DETROIT NEWS, 
Aug. 11, 2006, at 9A (describing how Michigan authorities, including state police, put 
emergency-response plans into action after British police reportedly foiled a plot by terrorists 
to explode planes bound for the U.S., despite the lack of evidence that any targets were in 
Michigan); Rebecca Lopez, Figure in Airport Watch Case Confirms Terrorist Tie, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 7, 2007, at 9B (reporting on two Muslim women in Dallas who became 
the subjects of a police intelligence bulletin after police observed them “acting suspiciously” 
at Love Field, though police also said they had no evidence the women were connected to 
terrorism, and one of the women had no criminal record). 
42. For example, missing, stolen, or otherwise suspicious vehicles, which might have 
previously been treated as just that, now draw intense scrutiny from police out of concern for 
possible ties to terrorism.  See, e.g., Colleen Long, Van Stirs Security Worries in NYC, BOS. 
GLOBE, Dec. 31, 2009, at A8 (reporting on the New York Police Department’s closure of 
Times Square after discovering a parked van without license plates in advance of New Year’s 
Eve celebrations); Allison Steele, Police Find Vans That Sparked Terror Alert, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 2011, at B4 (describing how the theft of four rental trucks in 
Philadelphia, shortly before the tenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks, prompted a 
terrorism alert among city police).  This is true even despite the occasional false alarm.  See, 
e.g., John M. Guilfoil, Van’s Fuel Sparks a Terrorism Response, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 17, 2011, at 
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responses are understandably colored by the terrorist attacks that have 
occurred in other countries during the years since the September 11 
attacks.43  But they have also become magnified in larger cities—
especially New York City, where police are quick to increase security 
and implement emergency-response plans at major tourist centers when 
a terrorism alert arises almost anywhere in the world.44  Clearly, police 
are going further than ever before to ensure that terrorists do not strike 
again.  But in some cases, such as those in the next section, these efforts 
come at great expense to the civil liberties of those the police are trying 
to protect. 
B. Local Law Enforcement’s Expanded Role in Counterterrorism Has 
Raised Civil Liberties Concerns in the Past 
Although the federal government was eager to enlist local law 
enforcement agencies as the “front line of defense” in the fight against 
terrorism,45 this involvement has become a double-edged sword in the 
decade following September 11, 2001.  In a number of incidents that 
have occurred during the last ten years, local law enforcement 
surveillance and intelligence-gathering activities conducted for 
counterterrorism purposes have drawn the attention of civil liberties 
advocates who say these activities infringe individuals’ constitutional 
rights.  This Part presents two of the most notable incidents from recent 
years, to provide a flavor of the types of activities with which this 
Comment is concerned. 
 
B3 (reporting on a counterterrorism response by police in Tewksbury, Massachusetts, after an 
officer spotted two college students “who appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent” loading 
compressed natural gas into a van; it turned out the van was designed to run on natural gas as 
part of a harmless—albeit unlicensed—experiment with alternative fuels). 
43. See, e.g., Tom Hays, Beneath NYC, Police Fight Terror with Stealth, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Apr. 13, 2010, at 1 (describing how the NYPD has studied terrorist attacks on 
transit systems in Madrid, London, Bombay, and Moscow to develop best practices in 
defending the New York City Subway); Kevin Johnson & Thomas Frank, Mumbai Attacks 
Refocus U.S. Cities, USA TODAY, Dec. 5–7, 2008, at 1A (reporting on new precautions taken 
with “soft targets” by U.S. police forces following the November 2008 terrorist attacks in 
Mumbai, India). 
44. Joie Tyrell, Terror Plot Foiled in Britain, NEWSDAY (New York), June 14, 2007, at 
A22 (describing how the NYPD strengthened security in the transit system and in major New 
York City tourist areas such as Times Square, Herald Square, and the theater district after 
police discovered a car bomb in a busy area of London). 
45. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
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1. Los Angeles Police Propose Mapping Muslim Communities (2007) 
In 2007, the counterterrorism bureau of the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD)46 began developing a plan to identify and map 
Muslim enclaves47 of Los Angeles.48  The plan’s ostensible purpose was 
“to help Muslim communities avoid the influence” of radical and 
extremist elements.49  Under the plan, the LAPD would identify Muslim 
neighborhoods that were at risk of isolation using data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau50 and demographic factors that, the police believed, 
made these neighborhoods susceptible to extremism and likely to 
become breeding grounds for homegrown terrorist cells.51  Having 
identified these neighborhoods, the LAPD would then add information 
from community members about residents, homes, businesses, mosques, 
“language, culture, ethnic breakdown, socioeconomic status and [even] 
 
46. As of 2010, the Los Angeles Police Department was the nation’s third-largest loca  
law enforcement agency, with 9,858 sworn officers serving a population of 
3.8 million residents.  Full-time Law Enforcement Employees by State by City, 2010, 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2010), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl78.xls/view (follow “Download Excel” 
hyperlink) [hereinafter Full-time Law Enforcement]. 
47. The metropolitan Los Angeles area—which includes Orange and Riverside 
Counties—has an estimated 500,000 Muslims, the second-largest Muslim community in the 
United States, after New York City’s.  Neil MacFarquhar, Protest Greets Police Plan to Map 
Muslim Angelenos, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at A23.  
48. Richard Winton et al., LAPD to Build Data on Muslim Areas, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2007, at A1[hereinafter Winton, LAPD to Build Data] (quoting Deputy Chief Michael 
Downing of the Los Angeles Police Department, who was in charge of the Department’s 
counterterrorism bureau at the time).  The plan quickly became known in the media as a 
“mapping” plan, though Downing disputed this characterization, preferring instead the term 
“community engagement” plan.  Plan to Map L.A.’s Muslims Sparks Outrage, NPR, 0:22–0:45 
(Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16162012 [hereinafter 
Plan to Map].  Perhaps ironically, however, the details of the plan first became public because 
of Downing’s testimony before a United States Senate committee, in which he himself used 
the word “mapping.”  Michael P. Downing, Commanding Officer, Counter-
Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau, L.A. Police Dep’t., Statement Before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate 7 
(Oct. 30, 2007) (prepared text available at http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Michael%20
DowningTestimonyfortheU.S.Senate-Final.PDF). 
49. Winton, LAPD to Build Data, supra note 48. 
50. Richard Winton et al., Outcry Over Muslim Mapping, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at 
A1 [hereinafter Winton, Outrcy].  But see infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
51. Winton, Outcry, supra note 50.  The same idea gained traction with police in New 
York City during 2007 as well, and likewise drew criticism from civil liberties groups.  See Al 
Baker, City Police Report Explores Homegrown Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at B3 
(describing NYPD report that finds, among other things, “unassimilated Muslims in the 
United States are vulnerable to extremism”). 
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social interactions” within the neighborhoods to paint a full picture of 
Muslim life in Los Angeles.52  To perform this analysis, the LAPD 
partnered with the University of Southern California’s National Center 
for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events.53  Although the 
LAPD said the program would not involve spying on citizens—
comparing it instead to market research, and insisting the program 
would focus on groups, rather than individuals54—the LAPD’s 
counterterrorism chief, Michael Downing, later testified before 
Congress that the program would use a “full-spectrum approach guided 
by an intelligence-led strategy.”55 
After the plan’s details became public, the resulting uproar among 
civil liberties groups and Muslim activists was immediate.56  Some groups 
compared the plan to “religious profiling,”57 and the American Civil 
Liberties Union and community leaders expressed “grave concerns” 
about the plan’s premise that “Muslims are more likely to commit 
violent acts than people of other faiths.”58 
The fallout was equally swift.  The Los Angeles Times’ editorial 
pages soon featured letters to the editor from non-Muslim readers 
generally condemning the plan.59  Muslim groups also protested outside 
of the LAPD’s headquarters building.60  The LAPD’s academic 
partnership with USC disintegrated as the university began distancing 
 
52. Winton, LAPD to Build Data, supra note 48 (quoting Los Angeles Deputy Chief 
Michael P. Downing, who headed the LAPD’s anti-terrorism bureau). 
53. Id. 
54. Id.  
55. Id.; Downing, supra note 48, at 7. 
56. Winton, Outcry, supra note 50.  But see Winton, LAPD to Build Data, supra note 48 
(quoting Salam Al-Marayati, the director of Los Angeles’s Muslim Public Affairs Council, as 
saying Michael Downing, the LAPD’s counterterrorism chief, is “well-known in the Muslim 
community” and has “been very forthright in his engagement with the Muslim community”). 
57. Winton, Outcry, supra note 50.  But see Plan to Map, supra note 48, at 2:20–2:57 
(interviewing the LAPD’s counterterrorism chief, Michael Downing, who said that the police 
used criteria other than religious or racial characteristics in identifying Muslim enclaves at 
risk of extremism, though he did not identify the specific criteria that might be used). 
58. Letter from Ranjana Natarajan, Staff Att’y, ACLU of S. Cal., et al., to Michael P. 
Downing, Commander, Counter-Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau, L.A. Police Dep’t 
(Nov. 8, 2007), available at http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/Muslim_Leaders_to_LAPD.pdf. 
59. See Margaret Manning et al., Letters to the Editor, Is the LAPD Off the Map?, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at A18 (featuring four letters to the editor regarding the mapping plan, 
with three condemning the plan and one in favor). 
60. Daniel B. Wood & Alison Tully, Why L.A. Police Nixed Plan to Map Muslims, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 20, 2007, at 2. 
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itself from the project.61  Experts, industry veterans, and Los Angeles 
residents alike expressed skepticism that the plan was even feasible, for 
at least four reasons: the Census Bureau may not compel Americans to 
disclose their religious affiliations;62 Los Angeles neighborhoods are far 
from demographically homogenous;63 surveys indicate American 
Muslims are more integrated and more dispersed than their European 
counterparts;64 and decades of controversy over similar monitoring 
efforts by the FBI had convinced federal officials that it was best to 
avoid any initiatives with even the barest racial elements.65  The LAPD 
initially stood behind the plan, but public criticism continued to mount, 
and less than a week after details of the plan became public, the LAPD 
announced it was cancelling the initiative.66 
It is important to note that the LAPD canceled the initiative not 
because police concluded gathering intelligence on Muslim community 
members had no value,67 but rather because of “widespread criticism by 
both Muslim and other religious leaders.”68  And though most 
community groups appeared satisfied by the LAPD’s response to their 
protests,69 civil liberties advocates remained suspicious, saying they 
 
61. Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim Mapping Plan Killed, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A1, A21 (reporting that “after details of the effort were made public 
last week, USC officials said they were carefully studying whether to join the endeavor and 
stressed that no deal had been made”). 
62. See 13 U.S.C. § 221(c) (2006) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no 
person shall be compelled to disclose information relative to his religious beliefs or to 
membership in a religious body.”).  This statute has been in place since 1976.  Act of Oct. 17, 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-521, § 13, 90 Stat. 2465. 
63. See Winton, Outcry, supra note 50. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Greg Krikorian & Teresa Watanabe, Experts See Value in Data on Muslims, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at B1, B10. 
67. On the contrary, veteran counterterrorism experts and academics said that the data 
would have been valuable both in the abstract and that there was precedent to indicate the 
data would have value in a pragmatic sense.  Id.  As one retired counterterrorism official put 
it, “In the old days, when you looked for La Cosa Nostra, you didn’t start looking in Polish 
neighborhoods.”  Id.   
68. Wood & Tully, supra note 60. 
69. Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton met for two hours with Muslim 
community leaders to hear their concerns before giving a public speech in which he declared 
the mapping project was “DOA—dead on arrival.”  Krikorian & Watanabe, supra note 66.  It 
is worth noting that, throughout the period of public outcry over the plan, both Chief Bratton 
and Deputy Chief Downing were generally well regarded by the city’s Muslim community for 
their willingness to hear the community’s concerns and their generally progressive views on 
community policing.  See MacFarquhar, supra note 47 (“Among those [members of the 
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would continue to monitor the LAPD’s activities in this area going 
forward.70 
The civil liberties advocates may have had good reason to remain 
suspicious.  The epilogue to the mapping initiative is that, in 2008, the 
LAPD launched a new program in which it modified the investigative-
report form that all officers must complete in response to a crime, 
adding a section to the form for officers to describe activities they have 
witnessed that may be related to terrorism.71  If an officer reports such 
information, the report is forwarded to the LAPD’s counterterrorism 
bureau, where it is entered into the LAPD’s database for further 
analysis—both by the LAPD itself and other law enforcement 
agencies.72  But the LAPD’s officers are required to report such 
activities even if the activities are not connected to criminal activity and 
even if the officer lacks any independent suspicion of wrongdoing.73  
Furthermore, the ACLU noted many of the activities considered 
“suspicious” by the LAPD were innocuous and commonplace.74  Despite 
these concerns, the LAPD’s suspicious-activity reporting model has not 
only become cemented within the department,75 but has also been 
adopted in at least a dozen other cities—where, so far, the only results 
 
Muslim community] interviewed, whatever their position on the project, Mr. Downing rated 
high marks for his community policing efforts . . . .”); Wood & Tully, supra note 60 (quoting a 
police accountability advocate as describing Bratton as “one of America’s finest” police 
chiefs). 
70. Wood & Tully, supra note 60 (quoting an ACLU attorney who mentions the 
LAPD’s “long history . . . of profiling” and that the group will “make sure that it[—]this 
profiling[—]comes to an end”). 
71. Josh Meyer, LAPD Leads the Way in Local Counter-Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
14, 2008, at B4. 
72. Id. 
73. Special Order, William J. Bratton, Chief of Police, L.A. Police Dep’t., No. 11 
on Reporting Incidents Potentially Related to Foreign or Domestic Terrorism (Mar. 5, 
2008), reprinted in FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY 
REPORT (SAR): SUPPORT AND IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, 36–42 (2008), available at 
www.it.ojp.gov/documents/SAR_Report_October_2008.pdf. 
74. MIKE GERMAN & JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FUSION CENTER 
UPDATE 1–2 (2008), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusion_update_20080729.pdf.  Examples included “taking 
measurements,” “using binoculars,” and “taking pictures or video footage ‘with no apparent 
esthetic value.’”  Id. at 2.  The report also cited several examples in which local law 
enforcement agencies across the country had temporarily detained or interrogated individuals 
for engaging in activities similar to these.  Id. at 6–7. 
75. Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton has described the program as the “‘heart 
and soul’ of the LAPD’s counterterrorism efforts.”  Siobhan Gorman, LAPD Terror-Tip Plan 
May Serve as Model, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2008, at A3. 
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from these reports have been non-terrorism-related arrests.76 
In many ways, the new program closely resembles (and achieves 
many of the same objectives as) the abandoned plan to map Muslim 
neighborhoods—it involves a comprehensive effort to gather and 
analyze data about everyday activities—but without a sensitive racial or 
religious component.  In fact, such intelligence gathering and 
surveillance remains one of the most common ways in which local law 
enforcement agencies have begun to encroach upon civil liberties in the 
name of counterterrorism in the years following September 11, 2001.77 
2. New York City Police Infiltrate Muslim Neighborhoods (2001–
present) 
Not long after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the New 
York Police Department (NYPD)78 established a secret intelligence unit 
designed to gather information on Muslim and other ethnic 
neighborhoods in New York City as the first step toward preventing 
future terrorist attacks on the city.79  The unit,80 which still operates as of 
 
76. See Eric Schmitt, Surveillance Effort Draws Civil Liberties Concern, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 29, 2009, at A12 (reporting that the LAPD program has also been implemented in 
Boston, Chicago, Houston, Las Vegas, Miami, Phoenix, Seattle, and Washington, D.C., as 
well as in Florida, Virginia, and New York State, with hopes for a national network to be in 
place by 2014; none of the city officials interviewed for the article could name any examples 
of potential terrorist attacks that had been stopped as a result of the program). 
77. See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40901, TERRORISM 
INFORMATION SHARING AND THE NATIONWIDE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT 
INITIATIVE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2011) (noting that “[a]lthough 
data mining for counterterrorism purposes predated the 9/11 attacks, it was considered a 
particularly promising tool after it was learned that certain database searches would have 
disclosed connections between . . . two 9/11 hijackers who were on a government terrorist 
watch list prior to September 11” (footnote omitted)). 
78. In 2010, the New York Police Department was the nation’s single largest city law 
enforcement agency, with 34,817 sworn officers serving a population of 8.3 million.  Full-time 
Law Enforcement, supra note 46. 
79. See Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, NYPD Spies in Jersey, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Aug. 25, 2011, at 1 [hereinafter Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies].   
80. In its current form, the NYPD’s intelligence unit is the brainchild of David Cohen, a 
retired CIA official who was hired specifically to turn the unit into a localized version of the 
CIA.  Id. at 5.  Prior to Cohen’s tenure, the NYPD’s intelligence unit was apparently best 
known for driving foreign diplomats around New York City.  Id.  City officials instead wanted 
a unit that would “analyze intelligence, run undercover operations and cultivate a network of 
informants.”  Id.  Cohen was just the man for the job—he brought aboard former colleagues 
from his days at the CIA to train NYPD officers in the art of intelligence gathering.  Id.  
Cohen also convinced a federal judge to allow police officers to open investigative files 
without any suspicion of criminal activity, lifting “major elements” of restrictions that had 
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2012,81 infiltrates these neighborhoods using undercover officers and 
informants as well as information-gathering and mapping techniques 
similar to those proposed for the earlier LAPD plan.82 
As part of the NYPD intelligence unit’s activities, undercover 
officers83 from the unit monitor ethnic communities,84 either directly or 
through the use of informants85 who attend local mosques and gather 
information from weekly sermons to Muslim communities.86  Using 
these techniques, the officers have infiltrated dozens of mosques and 
analyzed hundreds of them.87  NYPD officers file daily reports on 
innocuous behavior they observe at cafés, restaurants, and other public 
locations.88  They also talk to “store owners to determine their 
ethnicities and gauge their views” and join clubs and cricket teams in 
ethnic neighborhoods.89  And just as the LAPD had intended to do with 
 
been in place since 1985.  See David A. Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering 
in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After 9/11, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 
151 (2010); Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies, supra note 79; see also Chris Hawley, Barbara 
Handschu Likens NYPD Syping on Muslims to Spying on Free Speech Advocates, 
HUFFINGTON POST (New York), Nov. 17, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/17/in-
nypd-spying-a-yippie-l_n_1099479.html (stating that “Cohen  . . . asked Judge Charles Haight 
to loosen the Handschu rules” just “[o]ne day after the first anniversary of the attacks”).  The 
unit now employs “16 officers speaking at least five languages, [and] is the only squad of its 
kind known to be operating in the country.”  Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Documents: 
NYPD Spied on Area Muslims’ Ordinary Lives, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 1, 2011, 
at 5 [hereinafter Apuzzo & Goldman, Documents]. 
81. See, e.g., Michael Powell, In a Post-9/11 City, a Person’s Language Can Be a Cause 
for Police Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2012, at A17 (describing activities conducted by 
the NYPD’s intelligence unit “earlier this summer” in 2012, such as “eavesdropp[ing] on 
thousands of conversations between Muslims in restaurants and stores in New York City and 
New Jersey and on Long Island”).  
82. Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies, supra note 79. 
83. Undercover officers became known as “rakers,” following a comment from Cohen to 
his subordinates that he wanted the unit to “rake the coals [of New York City], looking for 
hot spots.”  Id. at 5. 
84. Id. at 1, 5.  Officers are matched to ethnic neighborhoods using data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau—a process that prompted officers to begin calling the unit the “Demographic 
Unit.”  Id. at 5. 
85. Officers recruited informants by arresting them for outstanding warrants or traffic 
violations, and then using the arrests as leverage.  Chuck Bennett, NYPD Has Shadowy Spy 
Guys, N.Y. POST, Aug. 25, 2011, at 12. 
86. Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies, supra note 79. 
87. Kimberly Dozier & Matt Apuzzo, CIA Probing Legality of Its Work with NYPD: 
Agency Helped Undercover Cops Spy on Muslim Communities, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, 
N.J.), Sept. 14, 2011, at 3. 
88. See id. 
89. Chris Hawley, Muslim Leaders: NYPD Spying Wrecks Mayor’s Goodwill, STAR-
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its now-abandoned mapping plan, the NYPD uses this information—
along with a list of “ancestries of interest”—to map the metropolitan 
area’s ethnic neighborhoods.90  The surveillance and intelligence 
gathering that officers perform for the unit’s investigations even 
occasionally takes them beyond the city limits.91 
After the program became public,92 the NYPD, the CIA, and New 
York City officials began the elaborate dance of denying the most 
controversial elements of the program, such as racial profiling,93 while 
asserting that police needed to do everything within their power to 
protect the city from future attacks.94  As with the LAPD’s mapping 
plan, it was not long before the tide of public opinion began to turn 
against the program.95  But unlike in Los Angeles, officials in New York 
City were not so quick to scrap the program, perhaps because the 
memories of September 11, 2001, were more vivid closer to the site of 
the terrorist attacks.96  City Council members questioned New York 
 
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 30, 2011, at 29. 
90. Apuzzo & Goldman, Documents, supra note 80.  The so-called “ancestries of 
interest” are from twenty-eight countries, “nearly all [of which are] heavily Muslim”—though 
the mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg, asserted that the NYPD does not factor 
religion into policing tactics.  Id. 
91. According to some reports, NYPD intelligence officers have operated as far afield as 
New Jersey, upstate New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Massachusetts.  See, e.g., id.; 
Bennett, supra note 85. 
92. The program became public through a series of investigative reports by the 
Associated Press.  See, e.g., Apuzzo & Goldman, Documents, supra note 80. 
93. NYPD Confirms CIA Advisory Role on ‘Trade Craft Issues,’ USA TODAY, Aug. 
26, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-08-26/NYPD-confirms-CIA-
advisory-role-on-trade-craft-issues/50143402. 
94. Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies, supra note 79.  Some, such as CIA spokesperson 
Jennifer Youngblood, portrayed the CIA–NYPD partnership as matter-of-fact (“‘It should 
not be a surprise to anyone that, after 9/11, the Central Intelligence Agency stepped up its 
cooperation with law enforcement on counterterrorism issues or that some of that increased 
cooperation was in New York . . . .’”), while others, such as NYPD spokesperson Paul 
Browne, were literally unapologetic (“‘The New York Police Department is doing everything 
it can to make sure there’s not another 9/11 here and that more innocent New Yorkers are 
not killed by terrorists . . . .  And we have nothing to apologize for in that regard.’”).  Id. 
95. See id. (reporting that “the Council on American–Islamic Relations, a leading 
Muslim civil rights organization, called on the Justice Department to investigate”); Adam 
Goldman & Eileen Sullivan, N.Y. Police Build Database of Immigrant Life, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Sept. 23, 2011, at 2 (reporting that state Representative Rush Holt has also 
urged the U.S. Justice Department to investigate the NYPD’s program); Hawley, supra note 
89 (reporting that Islamic religious and civic leaders feel that the NYPD surveillance program 
has cost Mayor Michael Bloomberg the goodwill he generated by supporting a controversial 
Islamic center near the World Trade Center site). 
96. See generally Jesse Washington, In N.Y., Taking Surveillance in Stride, STAR-
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Police Commissioner Ray Kelly about the program at a hearing in 
October 2011,97 but were apparently satisfied with Kelly’s assertions that 
the program is lawful.  Through the middle of 2012, various civil liberties 
groups continued to speak out against the program, and a Muslim civil 
rights group filed a lawsuit to restrain the NYPD’s intelligence unit from 
spying on Muslims98—but, in the interim, city officials have not yet taken 
any action against the unit.99 
Adding fuel to the fire of controversy, later reports indicated the 
NYPD program has so far had only mixed success.  In a high-profile 
defense of the NYPD, Representative Peter King of New York asserted 
that the surveillance had stopped at least fourteen “terror plots” in New 
York City since September 11, 2001.100  But a closer review of the cases 
cited by Representative King revealed that many of the plans “may 
never have existed,” or may have included “plots the NYPD had little or 
no hand in disrupting.”101  The program’s surveillance efforts were hit-
and-miss too,102 and the program has put a strain on the relationship 
 
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 13, 2011, at 11 (interviewing New Yorkers who express 
“ambivalence” about police surveillance, weighing the “competing impulses of civic welcome 
and civic safety”). 
97. Joseph Goldstein, City Council Grills Kelly on Police Surveillance of Muslims, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, at A23.  
98. Eileen Sullivan, Muslims File Federal Suit to Stop NYPD Spying, HUFFINGTON 
POST, June 6, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/06/nj-muslims-file-federal-
s_0_n_1574019.html.  The lawsuit, filed in June 2012, named eight New Jersey-based Muslims 
as plaintiffs and is supported by Muslim Advocates, a civil rights advocacy group 
headquartered in California.  Id.  The lawsuit was the first to be filed against the NYPD.  Id.  
At the time of the filing, however, a number of government officials, including the New 
Jersey State Attorney General and the Obama administration’s top counterterrorism advisor, 
had examined the NYPD program and concluded it was not breaking any laws.  Id. 
99. See NYPD Confirms CIA Advisory Role on ‘Trade Craft Issues,’ supra note 93. 
100. Rep. King Demands “Uninformed” Members of Congress Stop Smearing the NYPD, 
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.house.gov/apps/l
ist/hearing/ny03_king/stopnypdsmear.html.  The attacks supposedly foiled included plans to 
destroy the Brooklyn Bridge; flood the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, which cross under the 
Hudson River from New Jersey to New York City; and bomb the city’s Herald Square 
subway station.  See David Morgan, Other Foiled NYC Terror Plots Since 9/11, 
CBSNEWS.COM (Nov. 21, 2011, 10:28 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-
57328623/other-foiled-nyc-terror-plots-since-9-11/. 
101. Matt Apuzzo et al., NYPD’s Spying Programs Yielded Only Mixed Results, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 23, 2011, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/dec/23/nypds-
spying-programs-yielded-only-mixed-results/.  The attempted bombing of the Herald Square 
subway station in 2004 was the only attack that journalists could confirm had been prevented 
by the NYPD program.  Id. 
102. The NYPD identified several fringe groups within the Muslim community, but 
failed to identify certain radical members within those organizations; large amounts of data 
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between Muslim communities in New York and police, arguably 
hampering the NYPD’s ability to leverage local knowledge to its 
advantage.103  But the specter of another terrorist attack looms large in 
New York City, and the resulting “sense of national vulnerability” has 
enabled the program to continue operating.104  At the same time, many 
of the news reports detailing the NYPD intelligence program—like the 
LAPD’s mapping plan before it—expressed a certain breathless shock 
that such widespread surveillance could happen in America, tiptoeing 
around the central question: How could this happen? 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OFFERS LITTLE PROTECTION AGAINST 
POLICE SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
Among the many constitutional provisions that protect individuals 
from unwanted government intrusions into their day-to-day lives—and 
perhaps the provision that has the most direct relevance to law 
enforcement, criminal investigations, and surveillance—is the Fourth 
Amendment.  This Part will first discuss the historical development of 
the Amendment, which will help to illuminate why the police 
surveillance and intelligence-gathering activities described in the 
previous Part raise constitutional issues.  This Part then discusses three 
relevant exceptions to the Amendment’s general rule, which illustrate 
why many of the investigative tactics police use as part of their 
intelligence operations are exempt from the Amendment’s protections, 
and, from a constitutional perspective, generally continue unabated. 
A. An Overview of the Fourth Amendment 
By its own terms, the Fourth Amendment only protects against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures,”105 and the Supreme Court has 
historically held that, at least within the criminal context, a search or 
 
were gathered about entirely innocent people; and one investigative tactic—monitoring 
everyone in New York City who legally changed names—produced no results at all.  Id. 
103. See id. (describing how some Islamic leaders have counseled residents to avoid 
reporting extremist, anti-American talk to the police because the person doing the talking is 
likely a police informant); see also Harris, supra note 80, at 130 (describing how police use of 
informants in Muslim neighborhoods “will cause lasting damage to efforts to bring Muslim 
communities and law enforcement together to build a common cause against extremism”). 
104. David Crary, 9/11 Paranoia Gives Way to Fears That We’ve Gone Too Far, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 20, 2011, at 6 (quoting Donna Lieberman, a spokesperson for 
the New York Civil Liberties Union). 
105. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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seizure is generally unreasonable if it is conducted without a warrant,106 
subject to certain exceptions.107  The Amendment also prohibits the 
issuance of warrants without probable cause,108 a restriction that is 
important with respect to widespread police surveillance and 
intelligence gathering because “searches” include not only physical 
searches of premises and persons, but also, under certain circumstances, 
the surveillance of individuals, or even the collection of information.109  
As we have seen, a great deal of the counterterrorism-related 
intelligence gathering conducted by police in the years since September 
11, 2001, has lacked probable cause.110  While this might appear to 
indicate that such intelligence gathering—and any evidence gleaned 
from it—is barred by the Fourth Amendment,111 a brief survey of the 
Amendment’s history reveals that there are a number of exceptions to 
the Amendment’s rule that allow police to conduct these operations 
without constitutional consequence. 
B. Historical Development of the Fourth Amendment 
Although the Fourth Amendment was inspired by a lively period of 
revolution and political protest,112 it received little attention in 
 
106. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that, with respect to the 
Fourth Amendment, a search is unreasonable when it is “conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate”). 
107. The relevant exceptions are discussed later in this Part.  There are many other 
exceptions that are not discussed in this Comment, primarily because they either apply 
outside of the criminal context or because they have no application to surveillance and 
intelligence gathering.  See infra Part III.C.  
108. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
109. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding that “the Fourth Amendment governs not only the 
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements . . . the 
Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches 
and seizures”). 
110. See supra Part II.B. 
111. The primary method by which the Fourth Amendment’s protections are enforced is 
the so-called exclusionary rule, which prohibits the government from using evidence that was 
obtained through a search or seizure that violates the Amendment; this rule was established 
in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 398 (1914).  In 1961, the Supreme Court decided 
in Mapp v. Ohio that the Fourth Amendment—and with it, the exclusionary rule—also 
applied to state governments by way of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
112. The Fourth Amendment’s origins can be traced to the writs of assistance, or general 
search warrants, frequently used by authorities in Great Britain’s American colonies.  
Rachael A. Lynch, Note, Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Fourth Amendment Right: Samson 
Court Errs in Choosing Proper Analytical Framework, Errs in Result, Parolees Lose Fourth 
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constitutional jurisprudence for most of its first 100 years.113  It was not 
until Boyd v. United States, in 1886,114 that it became clear the 
Amendment protected individuals from unwarranted government 
intrusions upon their private property.115  From the time Boyd was 
decided until 1928, however, the Fourth Amendment was limited in that 
it only protected the “physical invasion of a protected space”116—and the 
Court’s strict adherence to this principle unwittingly set in motion 
events that would lead to our modern conception of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
In 1928, the Court decided the landmark case of Olmstead v. United 
States,117 in which federal agents—without a warrant—used a telephone 
wiretap over several months to discover that Olmstead and his 
colleagues were conspiring to distribute liquor in violation of the 
National Prohibition Act.118  The Court refused to grant Olmstead the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections, distinguishing his case—where there 
was no physical intrusion of the premises—from past cases where there 
 
Amendment Protection, 41 AKRON L. REV. 651, 654 (2008).  Authorized by the Townshend 
Revenue Act, 1767, 7 Geo. 3, c. 46 (Eng.), the writs allowed royal customs agents “to enter 
and go into any House, Warehouse, Shop, Cellar, or other Place, in the British Colonies or 
Plantations in America” as part of their duties.  The writs were most famously used in the case 
of Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.) 489, in which a printer responsible for a 
pamphlet critical of King George III became the target of one of the writs—as well as a cause 
célèbre among the American colonists and one of the most significant influences on the 
drafting of the Fourth Amendment.  See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 772 & nn.53–54 (1994). 
113. Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 
687, 700 (2011).  Possible reasons for this might be that the Fourth Amendment did not yet 
apply against the states; and there were few federal crimes.  Id. at 701. 
114. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).   
115. In Boyd, the Court considered the constitutionality of a series of laws that had been 
passed in the 1860s and 1870s.  Id. at 621.  The laws allowed the government to file an 
affidavit alleging a defendant had violated “any of the revenue laws of the United States,” 
and thus compel the defendant to produce related financial documents to help the 
government prove its case; if the defendant did not comply, the court would accept the 
allegations as true.  Id. at 619–20.  Although the government argued that there is no search or 
seizure when the defendant is the one producing the documents, id. at 621, the Court 
shrewdly noted that the law’s guilt-by-default setup offered defendants little practical choice 
in the matter.  Id. at 621–22.  Thus, the Court declared, the government’s invasion of 
“personal security, personal liberty and private property” ran afoul of the Amendment’s 
protections.  Id. at 630. 
116. Vivek Kothari, Autobots, Decepticons, and Panopticons: The Transformative Nature 
of GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 6 CRIM. L. BRIEF 37, 38 (2010). 
117. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
118. Id. at 455–57. 
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was an “actual entrance into the private quarters of the defendant.”119  
The Court bluntly concluded: “The Amendment does not forbid what 
was done here.  There was no searching . . . . The evidence was secured 
by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.  There was no entry of 
the houses or offices of the defendants.”120  The Court thus staked itself 
to its rule that the Amendment protected against government intrusions 
only in the case of intrusions into physical premises, and, in the process, 
ensured the Amendment “was not an evolving instrument of privacy 
protection”—especially with respect to new technologies.121 
Four decades later, perhaps recognizing that “the continuing vitality 
of Olmstead was in serious doubt,”122 the Court finally put the physical-
premises rule to bed.  In 1967, the Court decided Katz v. United States,123 
ushering in the modern era of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.124  In 
Katz, police suspected the defendant of violating the Wire Act,125 and, as 
part of their investigation, eavesdropped on Katz’s telephone calls 
without a warrant.126  As a result of the evidence police obtained through 
this warrantless surveillance, Katz was found guilty on all counts.127  Katz 
appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court, asking the Court to 
 
119. Id. at 464. 
120. Id.  There was no entry into the defendants’ houses or offices because the 
government had attached its wiretap to external telephone wires leading into the buildings.  
Id. at 457. 
121. Marceau, supra note 113, at 703–04; see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 
(1967) (“The law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not kept pace with these 
[electronic eavesdropping] advances in scientific knowledge.”). 
122. Nathan Petrashek, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of 
Online Social Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1516 (2010).  As the Supreme Court 
noted in Berger, the tide began to turn against Olmstead and its progeny in 1963, when the 
Court recognized for the first time in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963), that 
“verbal evidence may be the fruit of official illegality under the Fourth Amendment.”  388 
U.S. at 52. 
123. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
124. See Kothari, supra note 116, at 38–39 (providing a brief history of the Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, which summarizes Katz as the last case that led to the “modern 
search and seizure doctrine”). 
125. The Wire Act prohibits the interstate transmission by wire of information involving 
bets or wagers.  18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2006). 
126. FBI agents attached microphones to the tops of two out of three telephone booths 
in a bank of three booths that Katz was known to use; the third booth was disabled by the 
telephone company.  Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966).  The agents then 
watched the phone booths, and activated the microphones whenever Katz was in one of the 
booths—enabling them to obtain a record of Katz’s end of the phone calls, which involved 
“the placing of bets and the obtaining of gambling information” by Katz.  Id.   
127. Id. 
13 - ROUSH FINAL PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  11:26 AM 
338 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:315 
determine “[w]hether physical penetration of a constitutionally 
protected area is necessary before a search” violates the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections.128  But the Court, led by Justice Stewart, 
discarded Katz’s formulation of the issue, almost matter-of-factly 
asserting instead that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.”129  The Court acknowledged that Olmstead could “no longer be 
regarded as controlling,” and that the evidence obtained by means of 
the wiretap was inadmissible because it was obtained without a 
warrant.130 
Although Justice Stewart’s majority opinion invalidated the 
Olmstead line of case law, it never established a clear rule subsequent 
courts might use in place of Olmstead.131  Instead, later courts have 
followed the standard laid out by Justice Harlan in his concurring 
opinion,132 in which he agreed with the majority that the Amendment 
protects “people, not places,” but asserted that its protections could only 
be invoked if a two-part test was satisfied: “[F]irst that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”133 
Justice Harlan’s test—whether the defendant had a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy”—has become, for better or for worse, the 
modern standard for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.134  In what 
might be seen as an improvement over the Olmstead standard, Katz 
rejects stagnation135 and is “inherently non-static[,] . . . derived from 
evolving social norms, practices, and expectations.”136  But the Court’s 
increasing focus on reasonableness has also meant the Court has found 
that, under certain circumstances, an individual’s expectation of privacy 
was not reasonable—and thus that law enforcement was able to carry 
 
128. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. 
129. Id. at 348–51.  The Court famously went on: “What a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection. . . .  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.”  Id. at 351–52 (citation omitted). 
130. Id. at 353, 356–57. 
131. Kothari, supra note 116, at 39. 
132. Id. 
133. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
134. Marceau, supra note 113, at 705. 
135. Id. at 710. 
136. Id. at 705. 
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out actions that might otherwise offend the Fourth Amendment.137  
Indeed, many of the police activities conducted as part of the 
widespread surveillance and intelligence gathering operations described 
in Part II fall into these gaps in the Amendment’s protections.138  In 
short, “the shifting meaning of the Fourth Amendment that was 
adopted in Katz has come to be seen as a threat as well as a benefit to 
civil liberties.”139  This Comment addresses three of these exceptions in 
the following section. 
C. Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s General Rule 
1. Public Vantages 
Before Katz, when the Fourth Amendment still only protected 
physical spaces, rather than individuals, courts had long recognized that 
“the eye cannot . . . be guilty of a trespass.”140  And though the core 
Fourth Amendment doctrine has since undergone various twists and 
turns, the Court has consistently held that, as long as police are “lawfully 
present at a location,” visual surveillance is generally not a “search” 
within the context of the Amendment, and therefore does not invoke its 
protections.141  This is true even though technology and police tactics 
have greatly improved law enforcement’s ability to conduct visual 
surveillance,142 such that today there are still only two categories of cases 
where the Court has limited the scope of the public-vantage exception: 
(1) cases in which law enforcement’s use of surveillance technology 
allows officers to “exceed” normal levels of perception,143 and (2) cases 
 
137. See infra notes 180–85 and accompanying text. 
138. See infra Part III.C (discussing three of the exemptions to the Fourth Amendment’s 
General Rule—public vantages, assumption of the risk, and third parties).  
139. Id. at 138. 
140. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886). 
141. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 22–23 & n.134 (2006) (noting that the principles underlying 
the idea that visual inspections are not searches date to 1765).  This has remained largely true, 
even though the Court has subsequently been actively involved in deciding visual surveillance 
cases.  See Marissa A. Lalli, Note, Spicy Little Conversations: Technology in the Workplace 
and a Call for a New Cross-Doctrinal Jurisprudence, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 271 (2011) 
(noting that, post-Katz, the Court “became increasingly concerned” with methods that law 
enforcement used to gather information about the subjects of its surveillance). 
142. See Clancy, supra note 141, at 33 (noting that the Court’s “cautions and concerns 
about [new technologies] . . . have rarely been translated into labeling the employment of the 
technology . . . as a search”). 
143. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); see also Andrew Riggs Dunlap, 
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in which law enforcement relies on technology that is not in “general 
public use.”144 
The first category—ruling out surveillance technology that allows 
officers to exceed normal levels of visual perception—might seem to 
disqualify most applications of the public-vantage doctrine altogether.  
But the Court has been careful to distinguish between those 
technologies that exceed normal levels of perception and those that 
merely enhance perception, restricting only the former while still 
allowing the latter.145  In fact, the Court has drawn the line between 
enhancing and exceeding normal levels of perception such that a great 
deal of surveillance technology is still constitutionally permissible.146  As 
 
Note, Fixing the Fourth Amendment with Trade Secret Law: A Response to Kyllo v. United 
States, 90 GEO. L.J. 2175, 2181–84 (2002) (discussing the Court’s concerns with sense 
exceeding technology absent concerns about public use of the equipment). 
144. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
145. See Dunlap, supra note 143, at 2183 (“Technologies that allowed the government to 
‘see’ more clearly did not offend the Fourth Amendment.”).  A famous pair of Fourth 
Amendment cases illustrates the difference between enhancing and exceeding normal levels 
of perception.  In United States v. Knotts, the Court allowed police to track a criminal suspect 
to his secret lair using a radio beeper hidden in a drum of chemicals the suspect was 
transporting.  460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).  The Court said that no constitutional issues were 
involved, because the police could have just as easily used visual surveillance to track the 
suspect.  Id. at 285.  In United States v. Karo, however, police used a similar radio beeper to 
track the movements of a container of ether inside of a home; the Court held this was a search 
because “the police used the beeper to ‘see’ what they could not see unaided.”  Lalli, supra 
note 141, at 272 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714, 719–21 (1984)).   
 The wrench in the works is the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones, 
in which it held the use of a GPS device to track a criminal suspect’s vehicle amounted to a 
search protected by the Fourth Amendment.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 
(2012).  In Jones, police attached a GPS device to the bottom of the vehicle Jones was driving 
and tracked the vehicle for four weeks; the government later used this evidence to convict 
Jones of various drug-related crimes.  Id. at 948.  The Court distinguished Jones from Knotts 
and Karo, writing that in the two earlier cases, the defendants accepted the GPS device into 
their possession (albeit unknowingly), while in Jones, the police placed the device directly 
onto Jones’s vehicle.  Id. at 952.  At the core of this analysis is the Court’s insistence that 
Katz’s “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the [pre-
Katz] common-law trespassory test.”  Id.  Commentators were quick to seize on the Court’s 
decision in Jones as a “signal event in Fourth Amendment history”—though it may take some 
time before we fully understand whether, and how, it alters the analysis here.  Adam Liptak, 
Justices Reject GPS Tracking in a Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, at A1. 
146. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1986) (allowing 
the use of an aerial surveillance camera and photographic magnification that could detect 
“wires as small as 1/2-inch in diameter”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) 
(upholding federal agents’ airplane surveillance of the defendant’s marijuana crop from an 
altitude of 1,000 feet); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983) (ruling that a police 
officer who shined a flashlight into a stopped car “trenched upon no right secured to the 
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a result, this is not quite the broad restriction it may have initially 
appeared to be. 
The second category in which the Court has said police cannot rely 
on the public vantage doctrine—when their surveillance employs 
technology that is not in general public use147—finds its rationale in 
Katz’s rule that the Fourth Amendment protects defendants who have a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”148  But while this rule may appear 
fair in principle—defendants cannot be expected to take measures to 
protect their privacy against modes of intrusion of which they are 
unaware—it is also limited in practice.149  For as soon as defendants gain 
awareness of a certain type of technology, the implication is that “they 
are [then] responsible for protecting themselves from its possible 
invasions.”150 
Clearly, when it comes to widespread surveillance and intelligence 
gathering, the public-vantage doctrine is an enormous asset for law 
enforcement; even taking into account the limits described here, police 
may still conduct virtually unlimited visual surveillance of their subjects 
without offending the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment.  
 
[defendant] by the Fourth Amendment”); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952) 
(allowing the “use of bifocals, field glasses or the telescope”); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 
559, 563 (1927) (ruling that the U.S. Coast Guard’s use of a searchlight to spot a boat at sea 
“is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass” and “is not prohibited by the 
Constitution”). 
147. The Court first formalized this category of cases in Kyllo v. United States, in which 
federal agents suspected the defendant of growing marijuana inside his house; to determine 
whether this was likely to be true, the agents scanned the defendant’s house with a thermal 
imager, hoping to detect heat signatures typical of the high-intensity lamps used in marijuana 
cultivation.  533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).  When the imager revealed heat signatures, the agents 
obtained a search warrant and seized more than 100 marijuana plants from the defendant’s 
residence.  Sam Kamin, The Private Is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the 
Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 115 (2004).  On appeal, the Court ruled that the use 
of the imager constituted a search because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy regarding information about the interior of his house that the agents were only able to 
obtain using technology not in general public use.  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (noting that 
“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home 
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology 
in question is not in general public use.” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
512 (1961))). 
148. See Kamin, supra note 147, at 113 (noting that, when the risk of an invasion of 
privacy “is one that defendants face from their peers, their failure to protect themselves from 
it is an indication that they do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 115. 
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For example, police may use binoculars, cameras with telephoto lenses, 
or perhaps even remotely operated surveillance cameras151 to view the 
subjects of their surveillance at closer range without the subjects’ 
knowledge, provided that such cameras only allow the police to see what 
they could have otherwise seen unaided, and that there is a public 
awareness of the technology at issue.152 
But the intelligence gathering that police forces like those in Los 
Angeles and New York City are conducting in the wake of September 
11 may not even go that far.  In many cases, news reports indicate that 
human intelligence, rather than technology, is the main component of 
these police departments’ efforts,153 and officers focus on collecting 
information about daily life simply by being present at cafes, bookstores, 
mosques, cricket matches, and many other such places154—public 
vantages if ever there were any. 
2. Assumption of Risk 
Another tactic that police commonly use as part of widespread 
surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations is to employ 
informants within the neighborhoods and community groups subject to 
surveillance.155  Through the use of such informants, police can gather 
detailed information about neighborhoods, individuals, and 
organizations that might otherwise be inaccessible or difficult to target 
with visual surveillance conducted from public vantage points.156 
Within the context of widespread surveillance and intelligence 
gathering, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allows police to 
 
151. See supra notes 35, 38 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra Part II.B.1–2.  In fact, some residents of the areas under surveillance may 
be imagining a greater use of technology than is actually taking place—which leads one to 
wonder whether these individuals might be inadvertently undermining their own Fourth 
Amendment protections by expecting less privacy than what they actually enjoy.  See Kaplan, 
supra note 11, at 44, 46 (“Suspicion of spying is so rife among antiwar activists . . . that some 
begin meetings by welcoming undercover cops who might be present.”). 
154. See Hawley, supra note 89 (noting police spying in on cricket games, in ethnic clubs, 
in bookstores, and in cafes); Apuzzo et al., supra note 101 (noting undercover police 
investigation at mosques). 
155. In New York City, for example, reports indicate that police will often arrest Muslim 
residents for traffic violations or outstanding warrants and then use the arrests as leverage for 
convincing those individuals to become police informants.  See Bennet, supra note 85. 
156. See Harris, supra note 80, at 168 (suggesting that the use of informants in Muslim 
communities enables police to obtain the “maximum possible flow of intelligence on potential 
terrorist threats”). 
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make broad use of informants “at any point, and for any reason, without 
judicial supervision.”157  The reason for this is the so-called assumption-
of-risk doctrine—occasionally also called the misplaced-confidences 
doctrine158—under which the Courts have found that those who fall 
victim to police informants generally cannot invoke their Fourth 
Amendment rights, for both procedural159 and substantive160 reasons.  
And while the idea of assumption of risk may be a “curious way to 
discuss the use of informants”161—more intuitively, informants act as 
government agents in all but name—the doctrine was firmly established 
through a series of three Supreme Court decisions handed down in the 
1960s and early 1970s: Lopez v. United States,162 Hoffa v. United States,163 
 
157. Id. at 142. 
158. Petrashek, supra note 122, at 1529. 
159. Procedurally, like nearly all constitutional provisions, the Fourth Amendment only 
limits government conduct, not conduct by private actors, and because any alleged invasion of 
privacy in this context occurs as a result of the informant’s actions, there is no government 
conduct at issue.  See Harris, supra note 80, at 144 (“Because intelligence gathered by 
informants is categorized as a result of assumed risk rather than a result of police action, the 
Fourth Amendment does not regulate the gathering of such evidence.”) 
160. Substantively, by revealing previously secret information in public (such as by 
telling it to an informant), individuals must “assume[] the risk that their secrets [will] end up 
in the possession of the government,” and therefore lose any reasonable expectation of 
privacy they may have had—a key element for claiming Fourth Amendment protections in 
the post-Katz era.  Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption 
Create a “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?,” 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 511 (2001); see also 
supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text. 
161. Harris, supra note 80, at 142–43. 
162. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).  In Lopez, an IRS inspector confronted 
Lopez about nonpayment of taxes on the hotel Lopez owned, whereupon Lopez offered the 
inspector a bribe to clear the delinquency.  Id. at 429–30.  The inspector reported the bribe to 
his superiors, and also recorded subsequent conversations with Lopez in which Lopez offered 
the inspector additional bribes.  Id. at 430–31.  A jury later found Lopez guilty of bribery on 
this evidence.  Id. at 434.  Lopez argued on appeal that this evidence—the recorded 
conversations and the inspector’s reports to his superiors—was obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, id. at 437, but the Court noted that the inspector was present by Lopez’s 
consent, and concluded that “the risk [Lopez] took in offering a bribe . . . fairly included the 
risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court.”  Id. at 439. 
163. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).  Hoffa involved the union boss James 
Hoffa, who, while on trial for violations of the Taft-Hartley Act, met with various union 
officials in his hotel room and discussed plans to bribe the jury.  Id. at 294, 296.  Hoffa was 
unaware that one of these officials, Edward Partin, was relaying Hoffa’s conversations to 
federal agents, who then used this evidence to convict Hoffa of attempted bribery.  Id. at 296.  
Although Hoffa acknowledged that he disclosed his bribery plans to Partin willingly, Hoffa 
argued on appeal that this “consent” should be vitiated because he did not know Partin would 
later convey his words to the government as an informant.  Id. at 300.  Relying on Lopez, the 
Court responded that it had never “expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects 
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and United States v. White.164 
It is apparent from this line of cases that, although this doctrine is 
“fairly straightforward,” it nevertheless has “serious implications” for 
the privacy of the targets of police intelligence-gathering operations.165  
Doubtless some of the doctrine’s side effects are desirable when it 
comes to genuinely illegal conspiracies, giving criminals and terrorists 
alike considerable pause before they consort with one another.166  But in 
the case of widespread intelligence-gathering and surveillance efforts, 
such as those discussed in this Comment, these side effects will spill over 
onto the vast number of citizens who are not engaged in any kind of 
criminal activities.  Because the Court has chosen to focus its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence only on the privacy rights of individuals, and 
 
a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing 
will not reveal it.”  Id. at 302.  Somewhat ominously, the Court concluded, “[t]he risk of 
being . . . betrayed by an informer . . . is probably inherent in the conditions of human 
society[, and] is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak.”  Id. at 303 
(quoting Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
164. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).  In White, the defendant was convicted 
of engaging in illegal transactions involving narcotics, and much of the evidence against White 
came from conversations between White and an informant that were relayed to government 
agents by a radio transmitter concealed on the informant’s person.  Id. at 746–47.  Given that 
the Court had by now held in Katz that warrantless wiretaps were an invasion of an 
individual’s privacy, 389 U.S. at 358–59—a decision that had not previously been in place for 
the defendants in Lopez and Hoffa—White argued on appeal that, without a warrant, using 
an informant who was wearing a wire was similarly impermissible.  See White, 401 U.S. at 749 
(“The Court of Appeals understood Katz to render inadmissible against White the agents’ 
testimony concerning conversations that [the informant] broadcast to them.”).  But the Court 
once again refused to apply the Amendment, reasoning that “[i]f the law gives no protection 
to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it 
protect him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations which are 
later offered in evidence to prove the State’s case.”  Id. at 752.  The Court thus concluded 
that, like Lopez and Hoffa before him, White had no reasonable (or “constitutionally 
justifiable”) expectation of privacy, and could not shield himself with the Fourth 
Amendment.  See id. at 751–53. 
165. See Petrashek, supra note 122, at 1529.  The author asserts “serious implications” 
only with respect to privacy in the context of social networking, id., but given the breadth of 
the doctrine, its implications are clearly serious for privacy in any context.   
166. Justice White eloquently described the doctrine’s effect on the economy for 
criminal conspirators in United States v. White when he wrote, 
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his 
companions may  be reporting to the police.  If he sufficiently doubts their 
trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize.  But if 
he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his. 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 752. 
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not the shared privacy of groups,167 and because the police have almost 
unlimited license to use informants, this broader result can hardly be 
called desirable.  As the size of a person’s social network increases, so 
too does the risk that an acquaintance may be a police informant, 
forcing individuals to be unnecessarily selective in the acquaintances 
they make168—and leaving them with no recourse against the 
government in the event that even this level of heightened suspicion 
turns out to be misguided. 
3. Third Parties 
In addition to the police tactics discussed in the previous two 
sections (visual surveillance and the use of informants), a hallmark of 
the intelligence operations being established within local law 
enforcement agencies post-September 11 is a strong focus on data-
mining—gathering vast amounts of data from which police analysts 
might discern behavioral patterns and cultural norms that help to 
identify and prevent the next terrorist attack.169  The information in 
police databases could potentially come from not only surveillance 
reports and informants, but also from independent third parties, such as 
telephone companies, banks, and even the U.S. Census Bureau.170  
Although several commentators have argued that data-mining has yet to 
prove itself a viable tool in law enforcement’s counterterrorism 
toolkit,171 it remains a fixture of intelligence efforts.172 
 
167. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1136–37 (2002). 
168. See Petrashek, supra note 122, at 1529–30 (noting that the only way a person may 
protect himself from informants is to select his friends with care, and that “there is a direct 
relationship between the number of recipients [of information] and the risk that one or more 
of them will use the information . . . in a way harmful to the communicator”). 
169. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 316 (11th ed. 2011) 
(defining data-mining as: “the practice of searching through large amounts of computerized 
data to find useful patterns or trends”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a 
Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 
741, 746 (noting that data mining “was given a huge boost after September 11, 2001, when 
[law enforcement’s] attention focused on tracking terrorist networks”). 
170. See Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies, supra note 79 (documenting NYPD’s usage 
of surveillance reports and informants); Winton, Outcry, supra note 50 (explaining the 
LAPD’s use of U.S. Census bureau information to plan its mapping project); infra note 180 
(explaining the Court’s holding in Miller that banks can give out people’s records, as they 
have no right of privacy in those records); infra note 182 (explaining Court’s holding in Smith 
that a person has no right of privacy over their phone records held by their telephone 
companies).  
171. Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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Most of this information is not subject to Fourth Amendment 
protections because of the third-party doctrine, which holds that “a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”173  A cousin of the assumption-
of-risk doctrine—both count Hoffa among their ancestors174—the third-
party doctrine is one of the most criticized exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope, and there have been numerous calls to overhaul or 
eliminate it.175  But much like the data-mining it permits, the doctrine 
appears to be here to stay.  The Court has refused to find that many 
common data-mining practices implicate constitutionally protected 
privacy rights; instead, the Court has left the work of creating 
boundaries to Congress, which has done so selectively and not always 
successfully.176 
The doctrine got its start in Katz, where the Court issued its now-
famous statement that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,”177 and the 
Court also hinted at the doctrine in Hoffa,178 Couch v. United States,179 
and United States v. Miller.180  But the doctrine truly ripened in Smith v. 
 
343, 362 (2008) [hereinafter Data Mining]. 
172. See id. at 353.  This is partly because of successful marketing campaigns by database 
companies, id., but also because past experience has shown that, at least in theory, data-
mining could prevent terrorist attacks.  See BJELOPERA, supra note 77. 
173. E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); see Petrashek, supra note 122, 
at 1518–19 (discussing the implications of the Smith decision). 
174. See Lalli, supra note 141, at 259 (noting that the Court relied on the third-party 
doctrine in Hoffa). 
175. See, e.g., Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1381, 1382 (2008) (calling Smith “regrettable”); Lalli, supra note 141, at 261–64 
(summarizing three different critiques of the third-party doctrine, the common theme of 
which is that the doctrine is “outdated”). 
176. See infra Part IV.A. 
177. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
178. Though the Court in Hoffa conducted its analysis primarily using the language of 
risk, it emphasized that Hoffa took no measures to conceal his conversations from third 
parties.  See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (noting that “every conversation 
[the informant] heard was either directed to him or knowingly carried on in his presence”). 
179. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–336 (1973); see David S. Barnhill, Note, 
Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: Another Look at Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 627-28 (2010) (describing the Court’s holding in Couch that a 
woman’s reasonable expectation of privacy in her tax records “vanished” once she gave them 
to an accountant). 
180. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441–443 (1976); see Lalli, supra note 141, at 
260 (describing the Court’s holding in Miller that a bank customer “had no protectable 
Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his bank records because they were held by third 
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Maryland,181 such that a party now essentially relinquishes his privacy 
interest in a piece of information at the same time he relinquishes the 
information itself.182 
The third-party doctrine has held up in subsequent court decisions,183 
and it has become particularly worrisome to civil liberties advocates in a 
digital era in which individuals transmit large amounts of data and 
information across the Internet.184  By uploading files to Internet services 
like Facebook, Twitter, Craigslist, Google, and others, individuals 
transfer that information to third parties and, in theory, relinquish their 
Fourth Amendment-protected privacy interests in the information. 
While in principle the question of whether individuals relinquish 
their Fourth Amendment protections under these circumstances is an 
open question,185 in practice it may be a different matter.  Some have 
noted that, in Smith, the Court took pains to establish a 
“content/envelope distinction”—when transferring information to a 
third party, a person loses their privacy interest only in the “envelope” 
(the part of the information used by the third party for handling 
purposes, such as the telephone digits in Smith) and not in the content 
(the “hidden” part of the message, such as the actual, audible telephone 
 
parties”). 
181. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  In Smith, the victim of a robbery reported 
“receiving threatening and obscene phone calls from a man identifying himself as the 
robber.”  Id. at 737.  Police used information from the victim to identify Smith as the suspect, 
and then, without a warrant, asked the telephone company to install a pen register to record 
the numbers dialed on the telephone at Smith’s house.  Id.  When Smith once again called the 
victim, police were able to match the numbers dialed by Smith to the call received by the 
victim, evidence that eventually led to Smith’s conviction.  Id. at 737–38.  Smith sought to 
suppress the pen register as an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment, id. at 
737, but on appeal the Court said that Smith had no legitimate expectation of privacy with 
respect to the numbers he dialed on his phone.  Id. at 742.  Given that most telephone users 
realize they must “convey” the numbers they dial to a telephone company in order to place a 
call, the Court concluded it was “too much to believe that telephone subscribers . . . harbor 
any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”  Id. at 742–43. 
182. See id. at 743–45. 
183. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that “a 
person who places trash at a curb to be disposed of or destroyed by a third person 
[renounces] . . . ‘any reasonable expectation of privacy in the property abandoned’” (quoting 
United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1972))). 
184. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1531 
(2010) (noting that files uploaded to third-party Internet sites could fall outside of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment Pragmatism]. 
185. The Supreme Court has not yet decided “whether and how the third-party doctrine 
applies to Internet communications.”  Petrashek, supra note 122, at 1520. 
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conversation in Smith).186  Like telephone calls, Internet communications 
have envelope and content components, suggesting that a consistent 
application of the third-party doctrine would recognize at least some 
Fourth Amendment protections in messages being sent and documents 
being uploaded.  But many other scholars have noted the sheer breadth 
of the third-party doctrine,187 which in addition to offering little hope for 
defendants, also makes it difficult for commentators to predict how (or 
even whether) the Court will adapt it to meet the realities of the 
Internet-era docket.188 
Indeed, many of those same scholars have predicted the Court will 
continue to apply the doctrine “to all personal information possessed by 
third parties,”189 and they do not appear to be wrong.  The Court has 
made no moves to reverse course in this area, and in the current political 
climate, “[t]he scale is rigged so that security will win out [over civil 
liberties] nearly all the time.”190  As a result, at least from a Fourth 
Amendment standpoint, there is no restriction on the police’s ability to 
gather large amounts of data that individuals have disclosed to third 
parties.  The third-party doctrine may be a gold mine for police in their 
efforts to establish widespread intelligence networks, but the constant 
transfer of information that characterizes modern society means that the 
doctrine also exposes vast numbers of Americans to potential privacy 
invasions while giving them little realistic opportunity to call the 
government to account. 
IV. THE NEXT-BEST THING—PRIVACY FROM WIDESPREAD POLICE 
SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING BEYOND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Though the Fourth Amendment may offer individuals little 
protection against the investigative practices of police intelligence units, 
there are still other ways that individuals might preserve their privacy.  
 
186. See Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as 
E-Mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1049 (2008) (analyzing the envelope/content 
distinction with respect to telephone calls and postal mail). 
187. See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common 
Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1200 (2009). 
188. See, e.g., Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, supra note 184, at 1531–32 (noting the 
debate of whether and how the third-party doctrine applies to Internet cases is “difficult to 
resolve because the Supreme Court’s decisions are incoherent”). 
189. Id. at 1531. 
190. Data Mining, supra note 171, at 362. 
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This Part discusses what might be considered the best alternative to 
constitutional protections—statutory restrictions on police surveillance 
and intelligence gathering.  This Part first seeks to explain why statutes 
are a legitimate alternative to constitutional protections, and then 
discusses the competing interests—individual privacy and national 
security—that must be addressed in any potential statute limiting police 
conduct in this area. 
A. Legislative Definitions of Privacy Augment Constitutional 
Definitions 
As the previous Part illustrates, today’s constitutional notions of 
privacy and the Fourth Amendment’s protections of those notions are 
relatively narrow in scope,191 having receded from the high point of Katz 
thanks to the variety of exceptions that the Court has carved out in the 
intervening years.  Fortunately for individuals who may be subject to 
police surveillance, privacy law in the United States is “vast and 
complex,” and includes not only the Fourth Amendment, but “dozens of 
federal privacy statutes, and hundreds of state privacy statutes.”192 
It is true the Fourth Amendment is unquestionably the most 
important of these laws, the cornerstone of privacy in America.  But it is 
also, to continue the metaphor, the foundation of privacy in America, 
laid by the courts as a starting point upon which additional limitations 
and regulations may be built.193  History supports this idea.  After the 
Supreme Court decided in Olmstead in 1928 that wiretapping was not 
subject to the Fourth Amendment’s protections,194 Congress soon moved 
to fill the gap, passing the Communications Act of 1934, which placed 
significant restrictions on wiretapping.195  When the Court later decided 
 
191. See Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1474 (2008) (describing constitutional privacy protection as narrow in 
the United States, especially when compared to equivalent protections in Europe). 
192. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2006) 
[hereinafter Taxonomy of Privacy]; see also Katie Stenman, State Government Information 
Collection: The Shutdown of the MATRIX Program, REAL ID, and DNA Collection, 2 I/S: 
J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC. 547, 548 (2006) (“Ten state constitutions explicitly recognize a right 
to privacy, and many states have additional laws protecting various types of privacy. . . .  State 
laws protect these different types of privacy to varying degrees.”). 
193. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 858 (2004) (noting that “courts have 
successfully created rules that establish important privacy rights in many areas”). 
194. See supra notes 116–20. 
195. Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 
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that wiretaps did fall under the Fourth Amendment in Katz,196 Congress 
augmented this position with additional rules in Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.197 
More recently, in the 1970s and 1980s, Congress passed a number of 
other laws establishing privacy protections beyond those offered by the 
Court in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, many of them in 
response to decisions handed down by the Court.198  The most 
noteworthy law to come out of this period is the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, which was originally enacted to 
protect Americans’ privacy interests in their e-mail,199 but has since been 
amended to bring other forms of technological information under its 
umbrella as well.200  In contrast to the Court’s reluctance to develop 
specific privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment, Congress 
and the state legislatures have been quite active in this area. 
Despite this activity, the resulting statutes provide what is best 
described as a patchwork of protection of individuals’ privacy interests.  
There is no general privacy law in the United States,201 only laws that 
guard certain privacy interests in certain types of information or 
contexts.202  One possible rationale behind this scheme is that, in most 
cases, when individuals relinquish private information about themselves, 
they do so in a contract-like exchange in which they are able to 
negotiate the terms and assess whether the loss of privacy is worth the 
 
591–92 (2011).  Despite the noble intentions behind the Communications Act, however, it 
appears the Act was less than successful in achieving its desired end, as the FBI was able to 
continue its widespread use of wiretaps even after the Act was passed.  Id. at 592. 
196. See supra notes 106, 109. 
197. See Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 192, at 492–93 (summarizing Title III’s 
requirement that “law enforcement officials [must] obtain a warrant before wiretapping,” and 
its prohibition on the private use of wiretaps). 
198. See Kerr, supra note 193, at 855–56 (summarizing a number of privacy laws passed 
by Congress during this period). 
199. Id. at 856 (“Congress protected the privacy of stored e-mails and Internet 
communications by passing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.”). 
200. Id. at 871.  The law has been amended eleven times since 1986, although some of 
these amendments were admittedly “minor technical amendments.”  Id. 
201. See Daniel E. Newman, European Union and United States Personal Information 
Privacy, and Human Rights Philosophy—Is There a Match?, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
307, 338 (2008). 
202. Id. (noting several, including: the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) for medical records; the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) for 
financial records; and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), for 
information collected from children on the Internet).  
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consideration they will receive in return;203 privacy legislation exists only 
to level the playing field in those situations where individuals lack the 
ability to negotiate.204  The other reason why this scheme may exist is 
that Congress prefers to legislate only when necessary, waiting until the 
Court has defined a particular contour of the Fourth Amendment.205  
But this is a less-than-ideal approach, because, like most constitutional 
provisions, the Amendment is better used as a tool for evaluating 
statutes than for prescribing rules to fill the void.206  Whatever the 
reasons behind this scheme, the point remains: Existing statutory 
protections of privacy—though they provide broader coverage than the 
Fourth Amendment—still leave unregulated many of the police 
surveillance and intelligence-gathering tactics discussed in this 
Comment. 
That does not mean, however, we should abandon the legislature as 
a hope for better privacy protections, resigning ourselves to exploring 
the nooks and crannies of Fourth Amendment case law in search of 
some way of preserving individuals’ privacy against widespread police 
surveillance.  Far from it.  Although a number of scholars believe the 
judiciary is in the best position to guide privacy doctrine,207 Professor 
Orin Kerr208 has made a convincing case that the legislative approach is 
 
203. See id. at 336–38 (suggesting that federal personal-privacy law is based on contract 
law and discussing the process of bargaining away personal data in the private market).  
204. See id. at 336–37 (noting that the statutory framework for privacy in the United 
States “appears to be predicated on ideas from contract law” but that “Congress was willing 
to enact privacy legislation for the government, because people often lack a meaningful 
choice when dealing with the government”).  For example, it is well understood that if an 
individual buys a product over the Internet, she must relinquish private information about 
herself—name, address, credit card number—to obtain the product.  The possibility that the 
vendor will expose this information to the public is low, and is offset by the convenience of 
online shopping.  If the Internet vendor does mishandle her information, then she can easily 
choose not to do business with that vendor in the future.  But the same individual has no 
ability to negotiate with the government, or take her “business” elsewhere if the government 
uses her information for ends to which she did not consent. 
205. See Tokson, supra note 195, at 596 (noting that in the past, Congress has waited 
“for the Supreme Court to clearly define the scope of Fourth Amendment protection for new 
technologies before taking any legislative action”). 
206. See Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, supra note 184, at 1529. 
207. See, e.g., Tokson, supra note 195, at 596 (asserting that most scholarship on the 
Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine takes as a given the courts’ role as arbiters in 
“determining reasonable expectations of privacy in new technologies”). 
208. Professor Orin Kerr teaches criminal law and criminal procedure at George 
Washington University, where he has been a member of the faculty since 2001.  GW Law 
Faculty Directory: Orin S. Kerr, GEO. WASH. LAW SCH., http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/pro
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better because legislatures are not limited by the three significant 
constraints courts face on a regular basis. 
First, courts create rules “ex post in a case-by-case fashion,” meaning 
that courts cannot apply the Fourth Amendment to new developments 
in police tactics until cases involving those tactics come before them—
assuming the cases arise at all.209  In contrast, “[l]egislatures can act at 
any time,” even anticipating emerging investigative methods and 
proscribing or limiting them in advance.210  Second, by the principle of 
stare decisis, courts are bound to follow prior decisions, even if 
outdated.211  Though it has the benefit of making judicial decisions more 
predictable, stare decisis also gives the courts less flexibility; legislatures, 
on the other hand, can take a more dynamic approach, designing laws to 
meet the evolving needs of society.212  Finally, courts can generally only 
consider the facts of a given case, but legislatures can act upon a “wide 
range of inputs, ranging from legislative hearings and poll results to 
interest group advocacy,” resulting in more informed legislation.213  
Given these factors, legislation seems more likely to offer better 
protections and the possibility of redress to the subjects of unwarranted 
police surveillance than any attempt to challenge the practices under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
B. Any Legislation that Protects Individuals from Police Surveillance 
Must Sufficiently Address the Interests at Stake 
Any legislation limiting police intelligence-gathering and 
 
file.aspx?id=3568 (last visited Sep. 16, 2012) (click on curriculum vitae link for a list of classes 
taught).  The author of several criminal law casebooks, he has been cited in at least one 
decision by every regional United States Court of Appeals and by one account is the seventh-
most cited criminal law scholar.  Id. 
209. Kerr, supra note 193, at 868–69 (detailing the numerous procedural obstacles that a 
constitutionally questionable police tactic must overcome before a court may decide its 
legality—even at the lowest levels of our judicial system). 
210. Id. at 870. 
211. See Richard J. Dougherty, Originalism and Precedent: Principles and Practices in 
the Application of Stare Decisis, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 155, 157–58 (2007). 
212. Kerr, supra note 193, at 871; see also Tokson, supra note 195, at 595–96 (arguing 
that the “potential error costs of legislation may be lower than those of constitutional decision 
making.  Flawed statutes are relatively easy to amend, while erroneous Fourth Amendment 
decisions could require a constitutional amendment to overturn”). 
213. Kerr, supra note 193, at 875.  For an argument that the judiciary holds some 
advantages over the legislature, see id. at 882 (acknowledging that the judiciary’s 
independence can sometimes be an asset, especially when legislation is the product of 
disproportionately well-funded special-interest groups). 
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surveillance activities must sufficiently take into account the two 
competing sets of interests driving the debate—individuals’ privacy 
interests and society’s collective interest in national security.  These 
interests are intensely held by wide swaths of the public, and, for many 
individuals, these interests’ importance vis-à-vis each other are likely to 
change over time in response to current events.  The purpose of this 
section is to define these interests more clearly, in the belief that any 
legislation that does not take these interests into account will be 
ineffective or, worse, unlikely to pass at all. 
1. Privacy 
The general consensus among privacy scholars is that privacy is, as 
Hemingway might have put it, a fine thing and worth fighting for.214  
Most discussions of the concept begin by asserting, for example, that 
privacy is a “self-evident good”215 consistent with the “aims of a free and 
open society.”216  A number of these discussions have identified 
protected privacy rights throughout history,217 while others rely on the 
thorough discussions of privacy rights as natural rights conducted by the 
great philosophers of the Enlightenment.218  But so often these tributes 
to the greatness of privacy fail to consider why—or even whether—
privacy is something worth protecting with the force of law.  Even The 
Right to Privacy,219 the famous 1890 Harvard Law Review article by 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis—widely regarded as the first piece 
of American legal scholarship to advocate for a right to privacy in a civil 
 
214. See ERNEST HEMINGWAY, FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS 502 (1940) (“The world 
is a fine place and worth the fighting for and I hate very much to leave it.”). 
215. David Rosen & Aaron Santesso, Inviolate Personality and the Literary Roots of the 
Right to Privacy, 23 L. & LITERATURE 1, 2 (2011). 
216. United States v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  165 (1984)). 
217. See, e.g., Jeremy Osborne, Ascending the Slippery Slope: New Alabama Law 
Enforcement Procedures Fail to Adequately Protect Sexual Assault Victims’ Privacy, 5 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 785, 787–88 (2007) (identifying privacy rights in the Hebrew Torah and in 
ancient Greece). 
218. See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring 
“Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
289, 320 (2011) (discussing the beliefs of the seventeenth-century-English philosopher John 
Locke, who argued that individual autonomy and private property were inalienable natural 
rights).  In drafting the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the Founding 
Fathers drew heavily on Enlightenment philosophers.  Id. at 321. 
219. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890) (recommending the creation of a new tort to protect individual privacy). 
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law context—has since been criticized as too vague in describing its 
conception of privacy.220 
The result is that the notion of “privacy” has come to be a powerful 
but oftentimes meaningless incantation, invoked reflexively in a wide 
array of contexts without much more than lip service as to its actual 
importance.221  Although privacy may have longstanding traditions in 
both history and natural law, such justifications can appear especially 
bland or ill-defined when stacked against more timely and more 
concrete interests like national security.222  In light of this, it is worth 
discussing why individuals’ privacy interests are worth protecting in the 
face of police intelligence-gathering activities—such as widespread 
visual surveillance, the use of informants, and data-mining—all of which 
significantly reduce the amount of privacy available to individuals as a 
practical matter. 
Scholars have identified two main effects that a reduction in privacy 
will have on individuals and, in the aggregate, on society as a whole.  
The first category contains psychological effects, which have been 
thoroughly studied by experts.  “Failure to be able to achieve privacy,” 
such as would occur under conditions of near-constant surveillance, can 
have “devastating psychological effects, such as deindividualization and 
dehumanization.”223  At a basic level, individuals subject to such 
surveillance will begin to lose the “freedom of thought and mind.”224  In 
more extreme cases antisocial behavior will likely result.225  One well-
documented example of this—which also provides a better glimpse at 
the concept of total surveillance than we might like to admit—occurs 
 
220. See Rosen & Santesso, supra note 215, at 4–6 (summarizing the various criticisms of 
The Right to Privacy, and asserting that “even critics sympathetic to the conclusions Warren 
and Brandeis offer . . . have experienced difficulties perceiving the paper’s reasoning”). 
221. See Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 192, at 479–80 (noting that “‘[p]rivacy is a 
chameleon-like word,” used in “knee-jerk” fashion to “appeal to people’s fears and anxieties” 
(quoting Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some 
Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 458 
(1995))). 
222. See id. at 480 (discussing the imbalance between vague discussions of privacy 
interests and opposing interests that are “much more readily articulated”). 
223. Fradella et al., supra note 218, at 304. 
224. See Anuj C. Desai, Can the President Read Your Mail?  A Legal Analysis, 59 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 315, 344 (2010) (arguing that certain privacy protections further the values of 
“freedom of thought and mind”). 
225. Fradella et al., supra note 218, at 304 (citing Darhl M. Pedersen, Psychological 
Functions of Privacy, 17 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 147, 147 (1997)). 
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with Hollywood celebrities, who sometimes suffer emotional 
breakdowns because they cannot escape the paparazzi.226  Based on the 
descriptions of police intelligence-gathering operations reported in the 
media, it does not take a significant conceptual leap to imagine that 
those subject to such surveillance might quickly come to feel the same 
intense lack of privacy and the “extremely uncomfortable” 
psychological effects that go with it.227 
The second category of side effects caused by a lack of privacy 
includes behavioral effects, which can have a wide range of implications.  
When individuals become aware of near-constant surveillance, they 
begin to self-censor their normal behavioral patterns.228  This, in turn, 
enhances “the power of social norms,” as most self-censorship will 
involve individuals seeking to conform to mainstream societal 
boundaries.229  The result is a chilling effect on “eccentric individuality,” 
not only in fact, but also in our innate desire to realize such 
individuality.230  While under some circumstances this might be 
considered a positive aspect of certain narrowly defined police activities 
that deprive individuals of their privacy,231 intelligence-gathering 
programs like those described here are hardly “narrowly defined,” and 
are much more likely to affect individuals who have only a tenuous 
connection to the target of the surveillance. 
Some will argue that secret police intelligence gathering will not 
have these effects, or at the very least, its effects will be minimized 
because much of this surveillance is secret and the targets are unaware 
of its existence.  This is not likely true.  Police intelligence programs 
have, by now, been widely reported in the news media,232 and once the 
public has gained a general awareness of the possibility of surveillance 
through such programs, the mere fact of its existence can exert the same 
 
226. Id.  It is worth noting that lack of privacy can occur not only through surveillance 
but also through the “public disclosure of highly personal information.”  Id. 
227. Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 192, at 493. 
228. Id. 
229. See id. (noting that “surveillance is a tool of social control, enhancing the power of 
social norms, which work more effectively when people are being observed by others in the 
community”). 
230. Id. at 494 (quoting Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the 
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000)). 
231. See id. (acknowledging that surveillance can be a valuable social control when it 
comes to deterring crime). 
232. See supra Part II.B. 
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psychological and behavioral effects on individuals.233 
Enacting legislation that effectively limits police intelligence 
gathering and protects individuals’ privacy interests thus has several 
important functions.  First, it would restore the public’s psychological 
confidence in its own privacy, assuring individuals that they need not 
fear imagined possibilities in a constant state of paranoia.  Second, it 
would provide significant societal benefits, limiting the possibility for 
antisocial behavior that comes with reduced privacy.  Finally, it would 
eliminate or reduce the need for self-censorship, at least in certain 
circumstances, encouraging the diversity of thought, opinion, and 
behavior that is characteristic of liberal democracies.  All noble goals—
but this is only half the story.  This Part next considers the opposing 
interest, national security. 
2. National Security 
As with privacy, assessing the importance of national security as an 
interest to be protected is not a standalone inquiry; defending the 
country from terrorist attacks and other foreign threats is a legitimate 
and important purpose of the state.234  The inquiry here is why and when 
such an interest should be elevated above constitutionally protected civil 
liberties like privacy.  It is critical such circumstances are taken into 
account with respect to any proposed legislation that would limit police 
surveillance and intelligence-gathering practices, because “no 
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the 
Nation.”235  The government must be able to provide this security when 
 
233. Professor Daniel Solove of George Washington University Law School discusses 
this concept within the context of the Panopticon, a theoretical prison designed by the 
eighteenth-and nineteenth-century philosopher Jeremy Bentham: 
The prison was set up with the inmates’ cells arrayed around a central observation 
tower.  Most importantly, the guards could see each prisoner from the tower, but the 
prisoners could not see the guards from their cells. . . .  The prisoner’s “only rational 
option” was to conform with the prison’s rules because, at any moment, it was 
possible that they were being watched.  Thus, awareness of the possibility of 
surveillance can be just as inhibitory as actual surveillance. 
Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 192, at 495 (footnotes omitted) (citing DAVID LYON, THE 
ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 62–67 (1994)). 
234. David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of the Validity of 
Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.J. 611, 631 (1983). 
235. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981), quoted in Frederic Block, Civil Liberties 
During National Emergencies: The Interactions Between the Three Branches of Government in 
Coping with Past and Current Threats to the Nation’s Security, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
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we need it the most. 
As a matter of importance, national security has a long history; by 
some accounts, American national security predates even America 
itself.236  The challenge of preserving that security through more than 235 
years of wars, emergencies, economic shocks, and other exigent 
circumstances, both real and imagined, has produced a number of 
episodes in which the country has put its security before its civil 
liberties.  In 1798, Congress passed the Alien Act, which gave the 
President the authority to summarily order the removal of foreign 
nationals,237 and the Sedition Act, which prohibited the publication of 
materials criticizing the government;238 both laws were passed in 
response to rising diplomatic tensions with France that had potential 
implications on domestic politics.239  President Abraham Lincoln 
famously suspended habeas corpus rights during the Civil War.240  
During World War I, Congress passed the Espionage Act, which 
criminalized the “mak[ing] or convey[ance] . . . [of] false statements with 
intent to interfere with the success of the military . . . when the United 
States is at war,”241 and during World War II, President Franklin 
Roosevelt authorized the internment of Japanese-Americans living on 
the West Coast.242  Based on this long history, it took no great amount of 
prescience for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to assert, at a speech in 
New York City less than three weeks after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, that Americans were now “likely to experience more 
restrictions on personal freedom than has ever been the case in our 
country.”243  Indeed, civil liberties have once again come under fire in 
 
CHANGE 459, 459 (2005). 
236. William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security 
Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (tracing the origins of national security law to the 
Committee for Secret Correspondence, which was created by the Continental Congress in 
1775). 
237. An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798).  
238. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, 597 (1798).  
239. Banks & Bowman, supra note 236, at 16–17 & n.101 (discussing the circumstances 
leading to the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts). 
240. Id. at 17.  The suspension of these rights led to the military detention of more than 
20,000 individuals suspected of “disloyalty.”  Block, supra note 235, at 482–83. 
241. Espionage Act of 1917, 65 Pub. L. 24, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917) (codified as 
amended at chapter 37, 18 U.S.C. (2000)); see Block, supra note 235, at 483. 
242. See Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties, 29 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 175, 178 (2003). 
243. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Supreme Court of the United States, Address at the 
New York University School of Law Groundbreaking Ceremony (Sept. 28, 2001), quoted in 
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the years following the attacks.244 
Historically, there have been at least four different arguments used 
to justify elevating national security above civil liberties, and 
understanding these reasons is critical for evaluating the relative 
importance of the interest as a whole.  The first argument is that 
terrorists care little for our civil liberties;245 as a result, neither should we, 
because doing so would put us at a dangerous competitive 
disadvantage.246  A closely considered formulation of this argument is 
that our margin for error when dealing with our enemies—especially 
terrorists—is so small, or even nonexistent, that we need to be able to 
act without worrying about civil liberties protections.247  One’s response 
to this argument is likely colored by policy preferences—How much 
should we be willing to bend the rules in response to an extremist 
threat?—but giving up on civil liberties entirely seems somewhat 
defeatist.  Ample scholarship, as well as common sense, suggests that a 
balance can be struck that preserves individual liberties and privacy 
while allowing us to counter serious threats to our security.248 
The second argument, which has come into vogue in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, is that our conflicts now 
 
Block, supra note 235, at 459. 
244. See, e.g., Richard Schmitt, Covert Searches Are Increasing Under Patriot Act, L.A. 
TIMES, May 2, 2004, at A29 (describing civil liberties advocates’ concerns over the number of 
“secret searches” conducted by the Justice Department in the years following the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks). 
245. See Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of 
Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 34 (1983) (noting that the need for 
police to “respond in kind” to their enemies “has long been a traditional justification” for 
making greater use of technology in surveillance). 
246. See Lisa M. Kaas, Note, Liberty v. Safety: Internet Privacy After September 11, 1 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 175, 188 (2002) (recalling that Congress passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act in response to law enforcement’s pleas that they needed to be “equipped with 
the most up-to-date tools in order to combat an increasingly high-tech enemy”); see also 
Goldsmith, supra note 245. 
247. See Eggert, supra note 234, at 634 (noting that the Justice Department has argued 
that “foreign affairs often require prompt and decisive action”); see also John Mintz & 
Michael Grunwald, FBI Terror Probes Focus on U.S. Muslims, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1998, at 
A1, A8 (quoting a frustrated senior FBI official as saying, “We know that whenever we do 
something, people are going to call us jackbooted thugs.  But if we do nothing, people are 
going to yell at us when something blows up”), quoted in Ronald J. Sievert, Meeting the 
Twenty-First Century Terrorist Threat Within the Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional 
Law, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2000). 
248. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 242, at 177–78 (arguing that “it is possible for national 
security legislation to protect civil liberties, while achieving national security objectives,” and 
that national security and civil liberties are “not mutually exclusive”). 
13 - ROUSH FINAL PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  11:26 AM 
2012] QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES? 359 
involve stateless enemies for which there is no effective military 
response;249 thus, curtailing civil liberties in certain limited circumstances 
may be the best or only alternative.250  The operative word in this 
argument is “limited.”  Americans may be willing to recognize limited 
curtailment of civil liberties in times of emergency, or may be more 
willing to do so if the curtailment is well-defined.251  Prospective 
legislation must take this into account. 
The third argument is that national security is a precondition of civil 
liberties.252  In other words, civil liberties cannot exist without the nation, 
and if the nation is threatened, then we must turn our resources toward 
first protecting the nation; only once the nation is secure can we again 
worry about the freedoms that we hold dear.253  Although there is an 
attractive simplicity to this argument, it is important to note that it 
hinges on the assumption that the nation faces a dire threat to its 
existence.  Few Americans are in a position to accurately assess such an 
assumption, which means that, if the government is authorized to take 
national security measures that endanger civil liberties, the chance of 
effective oversight may be slight.  Any potential legislation must also 
address this. 
The final argument in favor of elevating national security concerns 
above civil liberties is a procedural one—that there is precedent to 
support it.  In 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence 
 
249. See Sievert, supra note 247, at 1427 
250. See id. at 1427–28 (identifying the “many practical problems associated with the use 
of military force” against terrorists, such as that they have no easily identifiable “home base” 
and that their foreign hosts may not be aware of their presence); John C. Yoo, Judicial 
Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 429 (2003) (noting that the 
war on terror is “unconventional” and the enemy “does not seek to defend or acquire any 
specific territory,” compelling the U.S. government to “undertake a full spectrum of domestic 
and international responses”). 
251. See Emanuel Gross, How to Justify an Emergency Regime and Preserve Civil 
Liberties in Times of Terrorism, 5 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 22 (2008) (explaining that in the 
face of terrorism related states of emergency, “the public might urge the government to 
change the traditional array of constitutional balances between civil liberties and national 
security in favor of the latter”). 
252. See Davis, supra note 242, at 238. 
253. See id. (asserting that “it becomes very difficult to preserve civil liberties if the 
survival of the nation is in the balance” and that “by preserving the nation we are better able 
to preserve freedom”); Kaas, supra note 246, at 189 (noting that “the liberties held so dear by 
so many Americans are made possible in the first place by a government that protects and 
defends its people against the acts of oppressive regimes”). 
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Surveillance Act (FISA),254 which generally provides the federal 
government with the ability to conduct electronic surveillance without a 
warrant as long as the Attorney General certifies to a special Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court that there is no “substantial likelihood” 
that U.S. persons will be a party to the surveillance.255  Despite that 
FISA “has been criticized for lacking ‘due process and 
accountability,’”256 and that its quasi-constitutional structure is not 
entirely compatible with the Fourth Amendment,257 the law has 
“withstood substantial judicial scrutiny”—apparent evidence that, when 
it comes to intelligence gathering, civil liberties should take a back seat 
to national security.258 
But the type of surveillance with which FISA is concerned is an 
inexact parallel to current police intelligence activities for two reasons.  
First, and most importantly, the law’s scope is limited to foreign 
nationals; if nothing else, Congress sought to avoid compromising 
Americans’ civil liberties in passing the law.  Second, FISA provides a 
complex set of controls to guard against abuses of surveillance: for 
example, surveillance applications submitted to the FISA court must be 
particular in describing the target of the surveillance, and must also 
describe “minimization procedures” that have been put in place to 
ensure that Americans do not become subject to such surveillance.259  It 
is hardly accurate to characterize FISA as a wholesale suspension of 
civil liberties, especially with respect to Americans, and it is equally 
inaccurate to claim that there is legal precedent that supports unlimited 
police surveillance.  Nevertheless, like the other arguments discussed 
here, its presence in the scholarship illustrates just how compelling an 
interest national security is—and one that must be considered in 
drafting any legislation that would limit police surveillance. 
 
 
254. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 112 Stat. 2436 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
255. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(B), (a)(3) (2006). 
256. Davis, supra note 242, at 190 (quoting Gerald H. Robinson, We’re Listening! 
Electronic Eavesdropping, FISA, and the Secret Court, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 51, 72 
(2000)). 
257. See id. at 196 (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s “criminal standard of probable 
cause” and FISA’s “foreign intelligence standard” of probable cause are “very different”). 
258. See id. at 204 (noting that FISA has withstood “substantial judicial scrutiny”). 
259. See id. at 192–93 (describing the requirements of FISA court surveillance 
applications). 
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V. A WAY FORWARD—THE MARYLAND MODEL 
 
Even if one understands the case behind each of the interests that 
will be implicated in a statute limiting police surveillance and 
intelligence gathering, crafting a statute that satisfies both will be no 
easy task.  Drawing on prior experience may help.  This Part suggests 
one possible model by looking at the legislative response to a past 
example of police surveillance that occurred in a non-terrorism-related 
context.  The statute discussed in this Part offers both a good starting 
point for limiting widespread police surveillance, and also some room 
for improvement to ensure it protects individuals from the much more 
amorphous intelligence gathering that has occurred in the 
counterterrorism context. 
A. Background 
In 2004, as the State of Maryland prepared to execute three 
prisoners over the next three years,260 a fierce debate arose in the public 
sphere over capital punishment in the state.261  In February 2005, 
following the execution of the first of those three prisoners, 
commanders at the Maryland State Police (MSP)262 began to worry 
about anti-death penalty activists protesting the two remaining 
executions and asked for a “threat assessment” from MSP’s Homeland 
 
260. The three prisoners were Steven Oken, who was executed in 2004; Wesley Baker, 
executed in 2005; and Vernon Lee Evans, whose execution was stayed in 2006.  Jennifer 
McMenamin, Evans’ Death Sentence on Hold, BALT. SUN, Feb. 7, 2006, at 1A; Lisa Rein, 
Anticipated Death Penalty Protests Prompted Spying, WASH. POST, July 26, 2008, at B1; 
Capital Punishment History: Persons Executed in Maryland Since 1923, MD. DEP’T PUB. 
SAFETY & CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicinfo/capitalpunish
ment/demographics_persons1923.shtml (last visited August 26, 2011) [hereinafter Capital 
Punishment in Maryland].  The executions of Baker and Oken were only the fourth and fifth 
executions in the state since 1961.  Id.  In 2009, Maryland tightened its death-penalty rules to 
limit its use to cases in which there is “DNA or other biological evidence, a videotaped 
confession or a video recording of the crime.”  Andrea F. Siegel, Md. Death Penalty Trial 
Delayed, BALT. SUN, July 24, 2010, at A6.  As of 2011, Baker is the last prisoner to have been 
executed in Maryland.  Capital Punishment in Maryland, supra. 
261. Rein, supra note 260.  The 2002 election of Governor Robert Ehrlich, a death-
penalty supporter, may have added fuel to the fire of the debate.  See id.; see also Former 
Governors: Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., MD. MANUAL ON-LINE: A GUIDE TO MD. GOV’T 
(March 7, 2012), http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanual/08conoff/former/html/msa12125.htm
l [hereinafter Former Governors]. 
262. In 2010, the Maryland State Police had 1,439 sworn personnel.  MD. DEP’T OF 
STATE POLICE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2010). 
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Security and Intelligence Division.263  After determining that there was a 
“‘potential for disruption’ at both executions,”264 the Division assigned 
four troopers to work undercover and infiltrate anti-death penalty 
activist groups for the purpose of gathering information about the 
groups’ future activities, such as protests and rallies.265 
The undercover troopers’ mission began in March 2005266 and 
continued for the next fourteen months.267  The troopers infiltrated 
protest groups, befriended activists, joined mailing lists, and inquired 
about protesting tactics, including civil disobedience.268  At some point 
during the investigation, the MSP’s net also widened to include not just 
anti-death penalty activists, but also activists protesting the Iraq War, 
animal-rights advocates, consumers protesting increases in electricity 
rates, environmentalists, and even a group committed to establishing 
more bicycle lanes in cities.269  In total, during the fourteen-month 
investigation, the MSP collected information and maintained secret files 
on fifty-three individuals connected with the various activist groups 
under surveillance.270 
Despite launching an operation of such considerable length and 
 
263. Lisa Rein & Josh White, More Groups Than Thought Monitored in Police Spying, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2009, at A1; STEPHEN H. SACHS, REVIEW OF MARYLAND STATE 
POLICE COVERT SURVEILLANCE OF ANTI-DEATH PENALTY AND ANTI-WAR GROUPS 
FROM MARCH 2005 TO MAY 2006, at 32 (2008), available at http://www.governor.maryland.g
ov/documents/SachsReport.pdf. 
264. Rein & White, supra note 263.  
265. SACHS, supra note 263, at 2, 13, 15 & n.10; Gadi Dechter, Surveillance Was 
‘Misguided,’ BALT. SUN, Oct. 2, 2008, at 1. 
266.  SACHS, supra note 263, at 13. 
267. Nick Madigan, Spying Uncovered, BALT. SUN, July 18, 2008, at 1A.  During the 
fourteen-month investigation, the troopers conducted a total of 288 hours of investigation.  
Id. 
268. See SACHS, supra note 263, at 35–37; Bob Drogin, Spying on Pacifists, Greens and 
Nuns, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at A18.  In terms of infiltration, these methods were 
unquestionably successful.  By the time the investigation came to an end in May 2006, see 
SACHS, supra note 263, at 1, one of the troopers had attended twenty-nine different meetings, 
an average of two per month.  Drogin, supra. 
269. Rein & White, supra note 263.  Although far from an accurate measure, it is worth 
noting that, by 2008, more than thirty activist groups had filed freedom-of-information 
requests with the MSP to determine whether they were among the groups that the 
undercover troopers had infiltrated.  Dechter, supra note 265.  The expanded scope was 
possible—and perhaps encouraged—because many of the activists’ causes overlapped.  Rein 
& White, supra note 263. 
270. Laura Smitherman, Ex-Police Chief Defends Spying, BALT. SUN, Oct. 8, 2008, at 
3A. 
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breadth, the MSP put few controls in place to ensure the operation 
abided by constitutional protections of civil liberties.  Not surprisingly, 
the investigation soon “spiraled out of control.”271  Although the activist 
groups under surveillance were “committed to lawful, peaceful 
protest,”272 and there was no evidence of “criminal activity or intent on 
the part of the protesters,”273 the undercover trooper frequently 
requested the case remain open and that surveillance continue.274  MSP 
commanders rarely, if ever, questioned these requests, and may have 
even granted such requests for reasons that had nothing to do with the 
original impetus for the investigation.275  Nor did MSP commanders take 
any action to stop the surveillance from expanding beyond the anti-
death-penalty groups that were the original targets of the operation,276 
even though they were reading the field reports from the undercover 
officers on a daily or near-daily basis.277  The MSP also had few controls 
in place for handling the information it received from the 
investigations.278 
 
271. Rein & White, supra note 263. 
272. SACHS, supra note 263, at 29–31. 
273. Madigan, supra note 267. 
274. Rein & White, supra note 263. 
275. SACHS, supra note 263, at 41.  By some accounts, commanders may have seen 
ongoing surveillance as a chance to give inexperienced troopers a chance at undercover work.  
Id. at 42.  Alternatively, the MSP may have seen the program as a chance to breathe new life 
into the MSP’s Homeland Security and Intelligence Division.  See Rein & White, supra note 
263.  In 2004, the division’s headcount had been “whittled” from about sixty-five officers 
down to twelve; the downsizing came after the police superintendent who had built up the 
division following the September 11 terrorist attacks was forced out because of corruption 
charges.  To those within the unit, the surveillance mission must have appeared as a chance to 
do serious police work and prove their worth.  Id.; see also Madigan, supra note 267 
(reporting an activist’s theory that investigations such as the MSP surveillance program 
helped local law enforcement agencies obtain funding from the federal government). 
276. See SACHS, supra note 263, at 38 (describing how, in interviews after the fact, “MSP 
commanders . . . could neither recall any contemporaneous discussions about the decision to 
expand the investigation to include anti-war groups and pacifists, nor could they articulate a 
sound law enforcement or public safety basis for doing so”). 
277. Id. at 41. 
278. The fifty-three individuals on whom the MSP maintained files were labeled as 
“terrorists” in the MSP’s database, Rein & White, supra note 263, even though some of those 
individuals included two Catholic nuns, a congressional candidate, and a man who 
campaigned against military recruiting at high schools.  Lisa Rein, Spying on Activists 
Discussed at Forum, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2008, at C3.  One of the individuals in the MSP’s 
files had never been to Maryland, while others had been there but were not present in the 
state when the spying took place.  Id.  Despite a lack of evidence of criminal activity, 
however, the MSP took no action to remove the information from the database; instead, the 
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The investigation and the surveillance became public in July 2008 
during a separate trespassing trial involving several of the activists,279 and 
the demand for a public accounting was almost immediate.280  Although 
the MSP asserted that the surveillance was not unlawful, and that the 
agency did not “inappropriately curtail” the activists’ civil liberties,281 
such justifications were short-lived.282  Within a day, Governor Martin 
O’Malley vowed to put an end to any police spying conducted without 
evidence of wrongdoing,283 and later appointed the former state 
Attorney General Stephen Sachs to lead an independent review of the 
MSP’s surveillance program.284 
Conducted over a two-month period in 2008, Sachs’s review was 
thorough—and damning.285  Following interviews with all of the major 
players involved,286 the review concluded that (1) the surveillance 
program “intruded upon the ability of law-abiding Marylanders to 
associate and express themselves freely;” (2) the MSP violated federal 
law by sharing its intelligence with other law enforcement agencies; and 
(3) the “MSP showed a lack of judgment” by describing peaceful 
activists as terrorists in various police databases.287  The review also 
 
information was shared with federal authorities and at least seven different local law 
enforcement agencies.  Rein & White, supra note 263. 
279.  Rein & White, supra note 263.  The program became public because of documents 
that were discovered during a trespassing trial for several activists in 2008.  See id.  
Subsequent freedom-of-information requests and additional lawsuits compelled the MSP to 
release additional documents pertaining to the program.  Id. 
280. Jonathan Bor & Gus G. Sentementes, State Police Spying Decried, BALT. SUN, July 
19, 2008, at 1A. 
281. Madigan, supra note 267. 
282. The surveillance program had been conducted under the administration of 
Governor Robert Ehrlich, a Republican who was in office from 2003 to 2007.  Former 
Governors, supra note 261.  By the time it became public knowledge, Maryland voters had 
replaced Ehrlich with Governor Martin O’Malley, a Democrat.  See Governor: Martin J. 
O’Malley, MD. MANUAL ON-LINE: A GUIDE TO MD. GOV’T (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanual/08conoff/html/msa13090.html.  If nothing else, 
O’Malley could easily afford to distance himself from the events of a predecessor’s 
administration because his predecessor came from the opposing political party. 
283. Bor & Sentementes, supra note 280. 
284. Laura Smitherman, Review of State Police Is Ordered, BALT. SUN, Aug. 1, 2008, 
at 1A. 
285. See SACHS, supra note 263; Smitherman, supra note 284.  Sachs was appointed by 
Governor O’Malley to lead the review on July 31, 2008, and submitted his final report on 
Sept. 29, 2008.  SACHS, supra note 263, at 1, 13.  
286. Sachs interviewed MSP commanders, the troopers who conducted the surveillance, 
and the activists whose organizations were infiltrated.  SACHS, supra note 263, at 14–15. 
287. Id. at 3, 6–7. 
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recommended several corrective actions to the MSP, including adopting 
regulations to more tightly control surveillance and notifying individuals 
who were wrongly labeled terrorists in police databases.288  The MSP 
subsequently announced it would adopt all of the report’s 
recommendations.289 
The public, however, demanded its own protections, and in 2009, the 
Maryland General Assembly passed and Governor O’Malley signed 
into law the Freedom of Association and Assembly Protection Act of 
2009.290  The law, as well as the regulations adopted pursuant to it,291 
provide for greater controls over police surveillance and intelligence-
gathering activities, while still offering police enough leeway to conduct 
legitimate investigations if the need arises.  This is a useful model that 
other jurisdictions might adopt.  The rest of this Part will discuss the 
law’s features and offer some modest recommendations for 
improvements upon the law. 
B. The Law 
The Freedom of Association and Assembly Protection Act contains 
several specific limitations on police conduct that serve to protect 
individuals’ civil liberties.  To start, the law’s key provision prohibits 
officers from conducting a “covert investigation” of individuals involved 
in “First Amendment activities” unless the top official at the agency—
for example, the chief of police—finds both (1) a “reasonable, 
articulable suspicion” that the person is engaged in criminal activity and 
(2) that a less intrusive method of investigation will not suffice.292  Within 
the context of the law, a covert investigation involves attempted or 
actual infiltration of an organization in which the law enforcement 
agency or officer’s identity is concealed,293 although the use of 
plainclothes officers for security purposes at public events is exempt 
from this definition.294  First Amendment activities include both 
constitutionally protected speech as well as conduct related to certain 
 
288. Id. at 8–10. 
289. Dechter, supra note 265. 
290. 2009 Md. Laws 2713 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701 
(LexisNexis 2011)). 
291. MD. CODE REGS. 29.08.01.04 (2011); 37 Md. Reg. 432 (Feb. 26, 2010). 
292. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2011). 
293. Id. § 3-701(a)(3)(i). 
294. Id. § 3-701(a)(3)(ii). 
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First Amendment rights such as “free exercise of religion, freedom of 
the press, the right to assemble, or the right to petition the 
government.”295 
In addition to the primary limitation described above, the law also 
restricts police conduct in other ways, several of which are directly 
applicable to the widespread intelligence-gathering operations 
established by police after September 11, 2001.  First, any investigations 
involving First Amendment activities must be conducted for a 
“legitimate law enforcement objective,” and in the process of 
conducting such investigations, police must take measures to “safeguard 
the constitutional rights and liberties of all persons.”296  Once all leads 
have been exhausted and no legitimate law enforcement purpose 
remains, the investigation must be terminated.297  Police may not collect 
information solely about a person’s “political beliefs, ideologies, and 
associations” unless it is either relevant to a criminal investigation or 
there is a reasonable suspicion of certain criminal activities.298  Finally, 
any information obtained in violation of the law may not knowingly be 
included in police intelligence files.299  Notably, the law also requires 
local law enforcement agencies in Maryland to have adopted publicly 
available policies governing their officers’ conduct in investigations 
involving First Amendment activities and their recordkeeping practices 
for information obtained from such investigations.300  Typically, such a 
 
295. Id. § 3-701(a)(5); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
296. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(d)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2011).  Legitimate 
law enforcement objectives are only those involving the “detection, investigation, deterrence, 
or prevention of crime, or the apprehension and prosecution of a suspected criminal.”  Id. § 3-
701(a)(7). 
297. Id. § 3-701(f). 
298. Id. § 3-701(g); see also id. § 3-701(g)(2) (listing the crimes for which a “reasonable 
articulable suspicion” allows the police to collect such information). 
299. Id. § 3-701(k).  It is worth emphasizing a law enforcement agency must have 
knowledge that the information they are placing in a criminal intelligence file was obtained in 
violation of the law, id., which appears to allow for the negligent inclusion of intelligence 
obtained in violation of the law.  But the statute that governs the act of collecting intelligence, 
id. § 3-701(g), contains no such qualifying language, suggesting that in a case of negligent 
inclusion, a plaintiff could still hold law enforcement liable for collecting the information in 
the first place. 
300. Id. § 3-701(m). 
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policy simply incorporates portions of the law almost verbatim.301 
As required by the law,302 the MSP adopted regulations for its 
practices involving the conduct covered by the law; although these 
regulations apply only to the MSP, they are useful because they provide 
additional detail on how a local law enforcement agency is 
implementing the law.  For the most part, the regulations mirror the law, 
but they expand upon it in certain key respects.  For example, whenever 
a regulated investigation is in progress, officers are required to submit—
and commanders are required to review—ongoing reports about the 
investigations within tightly limited time frames;303 the purpose of such 
reports is to provide commanders with a regular opportunity to 
terminate the investigation if it risks violating the law.304  Additionally, 
the MSP must purge criminal intelligence files that no longer have any 
informational value, and it must annually audit its files to determine 
whether any of them meet this criteria.305  Finally, the regulations also 
contain an important limitation that prevents police from circumventing 
the regulations by using third parties, such as informants, to obtain 
regulated information on their behalf.306 
Because the law has only been in effect since 2009, and the MSP 
regulations since 2010, it may be too soon to determine whether the law 
is having its intended effect.  Early indications are that it may have been 
successful; on its website, the American Civil Liberties Union does not 
list any examples of police spying in Maryland following the MSP 
incident described in Part V.A.307  Nevertheless, there are additional civil 
 
301. See, e.g., General Orders, Ronald A. Ricucci, Chief of Police, Takoma Park Police 
Dep’t, No. 631A on Covert Investigations (Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://www.takomapark
md.gov/police/documents/covertinvestigations.pdf.  For an example of verbatim text sections, 
see the identical definition of “covert investigation” in the Takoma Park Police Department 
General Orders and the Maryland Code.  Compare id. at 103A, with MD. CODE ANN., PUB. 
SAFETY § 3–701(a)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2011). 
302. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(b)(l) (LexisNexis 2011). 
303. MD. CODE REGS. 29.08.01.04A(4) (2011) (noting that under this regulation, a 
report must be submitted by a covert officer within two working days after each contact with 
the target of the investigation, and such reports must be reviewed by commanders within five 
working days after the report’s submission). 
304. Id. at 29.08.01.04A(4)(d)–(e). 
305. Id. at 29.08.01.04B(8)(d), .04B(9). 
306. Id. at 29.08.01.05B(2). 
307. Spying on First Amendment Activity—State-by-State, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
http://www.aclu.org/maps/spying-first-amendment-activity-state-state (click on Maryland for 
detail) (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).  On the other hand, it may just be that the MSP has gotten 
better at conducting its covert investigations. 
13 - ROUSH FINAL PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  11:26 AM 
368 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:315 
liberties protections that could be incorporated into the law, which are 
outlined in the next section of this Part. 
C. Recommendations for Improvements to the Law 
No law is perfect.308  The Freedom of Association and Assembly 
Protection Act is the product of the inevitable compromises that are 
necessary when crafting legislation that walks the fine line between two 
intensely held interests like protecting civil liberties and securing public 
safety.  Generally, the Act strikes a fair balance between protecting civil 
liberties (by giving individuals protection against certain types of police 
conduct) and preserving the ability of police to defend the nation’s 
security (by limiting its civil liberties protections to certain, more 
sensitive contexts like “First Amendment activities”).309  But as a model 
statute for other jurisdictions, it would benefit from a handful of 
amendments that would strengthen its protections without unduly 
burdening law enforcement. 
There are at least six different changes that should be made to the 
law.  The first three changes arise from both what we know about the 
nature of widespread police surveillance and intelligence gathering,310 
and what we know about the nature of covert investigative power—
namely, that it has historically been prone to abuse:311 Lawmakers 
should (1) expand the list of activities that trigger the statute’s 
protections; (2) require court approval for any request to circumvent the 
law; and (3) entrust responsibility for oversight to a third party outside 
the division conducting the investigations at issue (and preferably 
outside the law enforcement agency altogether).  The other three 
changes recommend themselves from the FISA, which, though it has 
weathered its share of due-process criticism,312 nevertheless contains 
some basic procedural elements that could benefit the Maryland law as 
 
308. Davis, supra note 242, at 178. 
309. See supra Part V.B.  
310. See supra Part II.B. 
311. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Unlimited Power: Why the President’s (Warrantless) 
Surveillance Program Is Unconstitutional, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 647, 672 (2010) (“One 
of the fundamental lessons this nation learned is that all power, including investigative 
powers, is easily abused . . . .”); Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me 
Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That 
Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 185 (2012) (“Covert surveillance 
methods are investigative tools that by their very nature invade the privacy of those targeted 
and are, as history has shown, prone to abuse.”). 
312. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
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a model statute: Lawmakers should (4) strengthen the law’s 
“minimization procedures”313 to ensure innocent parties’ privacy is 
preserved; (5) require police to provide regular reports to the city 
council or state legislature on both the volume and nature of 
surveillance conducted under the law; and (6) require police to develop 
training for officers to ensure they understand and will comply with the 
law’s requirements.  I will discuss these six recommendations in order. 
First, lawmakers should expand the list of activities that trigger the 
statute’s protection by broadening the definition of “covert 
investigation.”  The statute currently only includes investigations 
involving actual or attempted police infiltration,314 which means that, in 
its current form, the statute offers little protection against the extended 
surveillance or data-mining that are characteristic of post-September 11 
police intelligence operations, but which do not rely on infiltration.  
These activities should be included within the law’s definition of covert 
investigation. 
Although law enforcement advocates will cry foul, there are three 
considerations that should ease their concerns.  First, the law only 
applies to investigations involving First Amendment activities, which 
means surveillance, data-mining, and other investigative tools discussed 
in this Comment remain freely available in less sensitive contexts.315  
Second, the law arguably already prohibits the use of these tools in First 
Amendment contexts because it also prohibits the maintenance of 
criminal intelligence files containing information involving First 
Amendment activities when that information has no application to a 
current criminal investigation.316  Adding such activities to the definition 
of covert investigation only serves to make the law more explicit, not 
more burdensome.  And, finally, when it comes to gray areas, the courts 
are likely to give law enforcement the benefit of the doubt.317 
 
313. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2006) (defining “minimization procedures” in the 
context of FISA). 
314. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(a)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2011). 
315. Id. § 3-701(c)(1). 
316. Id. § 3-701(g).  
317. See Davis, supra note 242, at 178 (arguing that “laws will probably be interpreted to 
support the government’s tendency toward self-preservation when a ‘threat to the nation’s 
security is real’” (quoting David G. Savage, Historically, Laws Bend in Time of War, 
Rehnquist Says, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2002, at A22)); see also Harris, supra note 80, at 153 
(“In today’s post-9/11 climate, it is hard to imagine a federal court issuing directives limiting 
police use of surveillance activities . . . .”). 
13 - ROUSH FINAL PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  11:26 AM 
370 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:315 
The second change that should be made to strengthen the law is to 
require judicial approval of any request to circumvent the law’s 
protections, rather than the current requirement that such deviations be 
authorized by the head of the law enforcement agency conducting the 
investigation.318  At most, the agency head’s authorization should only be 
effective in cases of exigent circumstances—and only then until proper 
judicial authorization can reasonably be obtained.  Although law 
enforcement advocates may argue that this places an additional burden 
on police, the fact is that requiring judicial approval does not change the 
requirement that police justify their investigations with a “reasonable, 
articulable suspicion” of criminal activity—it only changes the person to 
whom such a justification is made.  On the contrary, requiring judicial 
approval to circumvent the law’s protections recognizes that, even when 
acting in good faith, police have an inherently “stronger interest in 
investigation” than in avoiding any collateral damage (such as to civil 
liberties) resulting from those investigations.319  Positioning the courts as 
a safeguard provides a counterweight to this interest. 
The third change is to give responsibility for oversight to a third 
party outside of the division of the law enforcement agency conducting 
the investigation (and ideally out of the police department altogether), 
because law enforcement agencies are not adept at self-regulation.  
Normally, self-regulation within law enforcement is driven by public 
dissatisfaction with police conduct,320 but in the case of terrorism 
prevention, the public’s insistence that the government do all it can to 
stop another terrorist attack from occurring may outweigh concerns 
over civil liberties infringements.321  Furthermore, past failures by law 
enforcement to self-regulate may suggest many agencies lack the will to 
self-regulate.322  Additionally, even in those cases where law 
 
318. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2011). 
319. See Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Damage? Juvenile Snitches in America’s “Wars” 
on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1189 n.248 (2009). 
320. See Evan N. Turgeon, National Security, Policing, and the Fourth Amendment: A 
New Perspective on Hiibel, 27 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 23, 49–50 (2008–2009). 
321. Elected civic leaders typically must answer to dissatisfied voters at election time, 
giving them an incentive to ensure that police keep their conduct in line.  See id. at 50.  But if 
voters send a different message—stop terrorists at all costs, for example—it removes the 
incentive for elected officials to exert pressure on police, and that protection is lost. 
322. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 481–82 (2004) (“A pattern of continued wrongdoing that is known but 
unaddressed . . . suggests that the organization has lost the will and/or the ability to police 
itself.”). 
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enforcement has self-regulated, these restrictions have often been rolled 
back post-September 11.323 
Oversight is better addressed by a third party—either a kind of 
ombudsman within the agency’s internal affairs division, or someone 
within the local government outside of the police department—who can 
bring local knowledge of law enforcement priorities as well as 
independent perspective and judgment to the required review of 
intelligence files.  Law enforcement may balk at such restrictions, but in 
addition to strengthening civil liberties, oversight may help police 
become more efficient, in at least two different respects.  On one hand, 
oversight will give police an opportunity to better understand whether 
particular investigative methods are working.324  On the other, oversight 
will help avoid duplication of efforts and eliminate waste, an especially 
valuable service for police departments that are stretched thin as they 
try to meet substantial demands with scarce resources.325 
The fourth change to the law is to strengthen the law’s requirement 
that police implement “minimization procedures”326 to ensure innocent 
parties’ privacy is preserved.  Although the law already requires that 
police take measures to “safeguard the constitutional rights and liberties 
of all persons,”327 in its current form it leaves this responsibility to police.  
Because police may be unable or unwilling to self-regulate,328 
strengthening the minimization-procedures requirement is essential, and 
can be accomplished in one of two ways: either the law could require 
judicial approval of minimization procedures established as part of a 
widespread surveillance operation,329 or the law could require that the 
 
323. See Harris, supra note 80, at 151–52 (describing how restrictions on the use of 
surveillance in Chicago and New York that were put in place in the 1980s have been rolled 
back after September 11). 
324. See Orin S. Kerr, The National Surveillance State: A Response to Balkin, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 2179, 2183 (2009) (arguing that there is a “natural role for oversight [of surveillance] 
focused on efficacy. . . .  If a surveillance tool or program doesn’t work, it shouldn’t be used.  
This seems obvious, but tends to become lost in practice.”). 
325. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the 
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1488–89 (2010–2011) (noting the 
“size and redundancy of the U.S. anti-terror apparatus” and arguing that independent 
oversight can address the “overall cost-effectiveness” of domestic intelligence spending). 
326. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (defining “minimum procedures” in the context of FISA). 
327. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(d)(2) (LexisNexis 2011).   
328. See supra notes 321–22 and accompanying text. 
329. This type of mechanism has been used in a number of federal laws related to 
surveillance; in addition to FISA, the Wiretap Act, also requires judicial approval of 
minimization procedures.  Pell & Soghoian, supra note 311, at 184. 
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relevant executive authorities draft rules in advance to specifically 
define what minimization procedures are required.330  Because 
minimization procedures “can and should play a role in limiting the 
privacy harms associated with” covert investigations, strong rules 
governing such procedures are essential to the law’s effectiveness.331 
The fifth change lawmakers should make to the law is to require 
police to regularly file publicly available summary reports on the nature 
and volume of regulated investigations they have conducted.  Such 
reports could be modeled on those mandated by FISA, which requires 
the Attorney General to report to Congress every six months on various 
aspects of covert investigations.332  Ideally, these reports will provide the 
public with the information they need to assess whether police conduct 
conforms to the public’s expectations,333 while remaining nonspecific 
enough to avoid compromising ongoing investigations.  Any police 
conduct that is uncovered through these reports but does not conform to 
the public’s expectations can be averted through further legislative 
amendments, mitigating long-term damage to Americans’ privacy 
interests.334 
The sixth and final change to be made to the law involves requiring 
police to develop training for officers to ensure they understand and will 
comply with the law’s requirements.  While this is perhaps the most 
functional and least strategic of the proposals outlined here, it 
 
330. As part of the USA PATRIOT Act, “Congress directed the [Department of 
Justice] to adopt specific minimization procedures for records obtained pursuant to” certain 
regulations related to national security.  Id. at 184–85.  Although some may argue this is still a 
form of self-regulation, drafting the rules in advance may at least limit the most blatant cases 
of manipulation. 
331. See id. at 184. 
332. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(a) (2006).  Among other data, the Attorney General must provide 
Congress with a breakdown of the number of persons targeted by various types of 
investigations, id. § 1871(a)(1), the number of times the Attorney General has authorized the 
use of intelligence acquired under FISA in a criminal proceeding, id. § 1871(a)(3), and any 
significant legal interpretations stemming from FISA-related court proceedings, id. 
§ 1871(a)(4). 
333. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 311, at 188–89 (detailing the public benefits of 
reporting requirements in various federal laws related to surveillance, such as allowing the 
media to report on the government’s increased use of wiretaps and scholars to study trends in 
government surveillance practices). 
334. See Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is at Stake with the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 269, 303 (2009) 
(asserting that “ex post oversight mechanisms” in FISA, as amended in the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881, “might mitigate the risk that innocent 
Americans’ communications will be acquired and retained”). 
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nevertheless serves an important role in making the law an effective 
barrier to the abuse of widespread surveillance powers.  Ideally, 
legislatures and city councils would continue to reevaluate the law’s 
provisions,335 but because this may not always be possible, the next-best 
option may be police departments staffed by officers who are well 
acquainted with the legislative intent, and the surveillance that is 
permitted within the law’s boundaries.336  Additionally, similar to FISA, 
the law might include provisions that restrict officers from participating 
in regulated investigations until they have received the required 
training, and that the effectiveness of training be evaluated by the head 
of the department or a third-party ombudsman on a regular basis.337 
Taken together, these proposals should result in a model statute that 
provides strong and durable oversight over widespread police 
surveillance and intelligence gathering—at least in sensitive contexts 
such as those regulated by the First Amendment—while still allowing 
police the capability to preemptively track and disrupt potential terrorist 
organizations.  In the final section of this Part, this Comment will return 
to the cases in Los Angeles and New York City, discussed earlier, to 
assess whether the law might truly be effective. 
D. Applying the Law—How Things Might Have Been Different 
The cases in New York City338 and Los Angeles339 discussed in Part 
II.B. provide typical examples of the type of widespread police 
surveillance and intelligence gathering with which this Comment is 
concerned.  In closing, the final section of this Part will attempt to 
illustrate how an amended version340 of the Maryland Freedom of 
Association and Assembly Protection Act might have mitigated police 
conduct and protected civil liberties in those cases (and others like 
 
335. See Charles A. Shanor, Terrorism, Historical Analogies, and Modern Choices, 24 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 589, 606 (2010) (arguing that ongoing legislative rulemaking is the best 
solution for intelligence oversight, in the long run superior to either judicial process or an 
unregulated executive). 
336. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 334, at 303 (highlighting the requirement imposed by the 
FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(f)(1), that intelligence personnel be 
trained in the implementation of FISA’s restrictions as an effective way to mitigate the risks 
FISA poses to Americans’ civil liberties). 
337. See Blum, supra note 334, at 303. 
338. See supra Part II.B.2. 
339. See supra Part II.B.1. 
340. For the purposes of this section, I will assume the law has been amended and 
strengthened in accordance with the proposals outlined in Part V.C. 
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them), had the law been in place in each jurisdiction. 
The most important protection that the law would have provided is 
that widespread surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations, like 
those conducted by the LAPD and NYPD, would have qualified under 
the law as “covert investigations,” and thus become subject to the law’s 
regulations.341  As a result, the investigations could not have 
proceeded—at least with respect to First Amendment activities such as 
the free exercise of religion or peaceable assembly—without judicial 
authorization.342  To obtain such an authorization, police would have had 
to argue before a judge that there was both a “reasonable, articulable 
suspicion” of criminal activity, and that no less intrusive investigative 
method would satisfy police objectives.343  All of these procedural 
hurdles would have provided opportunities to stop, limit, or better 
control the investigations. 
Assuming, arguendo, that courts decided the LAPD and NYPD 
intelligence-gathering operations satisfied this standard and allowed 
police to continue, authorities would still have had to comply with the 
law’s other oversight mechanisms.  For example, police would have been 
required to compile minimization plans to ensure that innocent 
members of the public saw their privacy rights preserved, and such plans 
would have either required judicial approval, or must have complied 
with the guidelines established by authorities in advance.344  
Furthermore, police would either be prohibited from maintaining 
intelligence files on information gathered through these investigations 
(if the information was gathered in violation of the law), or police would 
have been required to purge the information when regular audits 
revealed that it no longer had any informational value to an ongoing 
investigation.345 
In addition, police would have had to regularly file reports—either 
 
341. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text. 
342. See supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
343. See supra note 292. 
344. See supra notes 327–31 and accompanying text.  Minimization procedures would 
have been useful in both cases.  The NYPD almost certainly gathered intelligence on innocent 
individuals through undercover police reports on everyday activities at cafés, restaurants, and 
other public locations.  See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.  The LAPD’s current 
suspicious-activity reporting program, which allows police to report their observations of 
innocuous activity without any independent suspicion of wrongdoing, likely has the same 
result.  See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra notes 304–05 and accompanying text. 
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to the city council, the state legislature, or some other independent 
oversight commission, depending on how the law was drafted—on the 
volume and type of surveillance they were conducting, which would 
provide the public with additional opportunities for oversight.346  In cases 
of widespread surveillance and intelligence gathering like those in New 
York City and Los Angeles, this might have offered the public a glimpse 
of both programs before they triggered public outrage, and given police 
a chance to better consult with residents on how best to achieve their 
objectives while respecting civil liberties.347 
Finally, with a law like the amended version of the Maryland 
Freedom of Association and Assembly Protection Act in place—and the 
greater awareness of the delicate balance between national security and 
civil liberties that would come with the law’s control mechanisms348—it is 
possible that police might have decided to devise an entirely different 
type of counterterrorism intelligence program.  But the more important 
point is that, with these control mechanisms in place, the public would 
be better poised to respond with flexible, dynamic laws and regulations 
to preserve privacy while still addressing national security.  As can be 
seen, this approach has a number of advantages over more static 
constitutional remedies like those in the Fourth Amendment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In our current political climate, the nation’s collective thumb is 
indeed pressing on the scale in the direction of national security.349  The 
population demands protection from further terrorist attacks and insists 
that the devastation of September 11, 2001, not be allowed to repeat 
itself.  The government has responded, making funding available to 
police forces across the country and encouraging them to serve as the 
front line in the war on terror, even if at the expense of civil liberties.  
But, though we may have asked for such measures, we are not 
subsequently prevented from unasking them in the interest of protecting 
our civil liberties.  This Comment has discussed two significant ways this 
 
346. See supra notes 332–33 and accompanying text. 
347. Police appear to have attempted this, somewhat belatedly, in Los Angeles.  See 
supra note 69.  In New York, however, the surveillance program appears to have been kept 
much more secret, with no attempt at community engagement.  See Hawley, supra note 89. 
348. See supra Part V.C for an outline of the proposed control mechanisms, such as 
third-party oversight, regular reporting of surveillance activities, and in-depth training for 
officers involved in intelligence-gathering operations. 
349. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
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might occur.  One—the Fourth Amendment—may not offer much hope 
for individuals, while the other—statutory limits—appears more 
promising.  The so-called Maryland model discussed in Part V is only 
one example of such a statute, but the specific form and substance of 
such a statute, and even whether a statute is the best corrective method, 
will be left to the decision makers of the future.  It is imperative, 
however, that a decision be made.  Surveillance and intelligence-
gathering methods and technologies will only become more covert, 
more invasive, and more economically feasible.  Taking the easy way 
out—punting these decisions another thirty years into the future—is to 
risk allowing the issue to bypass us altogether, such that the use of these 
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